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Foreword
On 11 September 2003, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered 
into force. By 31 December 2006, 137 countries had ratified 
or acceded to the Protocol, signalling the importance that 
countries attach to the issue of biosafety.
For many countries, participation in the Cartagena Protocol has 
been a challenge, due to a lack of capacity for biosafety activity 
at the national level. In response, the Conference of the Parties 
of the CBD, working with the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) has made resources available to build capacity for the 
Protocol’s implementation. 
In its capacity as an Implementing Agency of the GEF, UNEP has been providing 
administrative and technical assistance to countries participating in a global development 
project, within which 124 countries have developed National Biosafety Frameworks. In 
addition, UNEP has assisted eight countries to successfully implement their National 
Biosafety Frameworks, and is also assisting more than 139 countries to use and participate in 
the Biosafety Clearing House.
Much of the experience of this capacity building has been captured in the Comparative 
Analysis, produced by the staff of the UNEP Biosafety Unit who developed and managed 
these multi-country activities. There are many lessons to be learned from it, particularly on 
how over 130 countries have worked with UNEP to build—from nothing in many cases—
sustainable systems for the safe use of biotechnology. The lessons learned in working with 
a diverse range of developmental, socio-economic and technological conditions are also 
apparent, as are the multiple methods that the UNEP Biosafety Unit has developed to meet 
the challenges in biosafety and biotechnology.
Under the Bali Strategic Plan on Technology support and capacity building, adopted 
by the UNEP Governing Council in 2005, UNEP is mandated to provide more coherent, 
coordinated and effective delivery of environmental capacity building and technical support 
at all levels in response to well-defined country priorities and needs. The work analyzed 
in the publication provides an excellent example of how this mandate can, and should, be 
fulfilled. I commend it as a valuable addition to a growing body of work that demonstrates 
how targeted partnerships can support equitable and sustainable development.
Achim Steiner
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and 
Executive Director, United Nations Environment Programme 
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Foreword
The Comparative Analysis of Experiences and Lessons 
from the UNEP-GEF Biosafety Projects, which sets out the 
path toward implementation of the Cartagena Protocol, can 
serve as an important synthesis tool in demonstrating the 
collaborative efforts of participants in the National Biosafety 
Framework Development Project, including the engaged 
countries, the GEF, and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
Secretariat.
The creation of capacity in the area of biosafety is critical, and 
remains today a priority for the GEF. At the GEF, as part of 
this priority, we have engaged in a continual evolution and expansion of support to countries 
for implementing the Protocol. After the Protocol’s adoption, the GEF Council approved an 
initial strategy to help countries prepare for its entry into force by providing assistance to 
more than 120 countries to develop their national biosafety frameworks (NBFs). Since then, 
GEF has supported 139 countries in the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) and 12 countries 
which are participating in implementation projects for the Protocol. The total amount 
allocated to these projects exceeds $56 million.
After the Protocol entered into force in September 2003, the GEF Council extended its 
support to 11 countries to move forward in implementing their NBFs; and two regions, Latin 
America and West Africa, have received support to strengthen regional centers of excellence 
to assist their countries to implement the CPB. Total funding for these activities has been close to 
$18 million.
Further to a successful fourth replenishment of the GEF in August 2006, the GEF Council 
approved a renewed Strategy for Financing Biosafety, as a framework for projects designed to 
implement the CPB. We have invited our partners to collaborate with us to provide assistance to 
countries to continue our role in biosafety capacity building.
This work is urgent. I am pleased that this publication helps clarify the benchmarks and lessons 
from which we can draw so that, with the effort of all stakeholders, we will achieve our goal of 
helping countries to implement the CPB for the better protection of biological diversity.
Monique Barbut,
CEO and Chairperson,
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
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Foreword
This comparative analysis study on the 124 countries in the 
National Biosafety Frameworks (NBF) development project, and 
the eight demonstration implementation projects, encompasses 
valuable experiences, lessons learned and best practices that will 
further enrich the development of the processes of implementation, 
specifically with regard to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
The analysis will also serve to augment the knowledge base 
for processes of implementing other Multilateral Environment 
Agreements.
It is no exaggeration to say that the study has made a major 
contribution towards exploiting modern biotechnology in a safe manner. It will enrich the 
country processes in putting in place their NFB in a cohesive fashion, and in the process 
ensure the maximum use of their resources.
Indeed, the adoption in January 2000 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and its 
subsequent entry into force on 11 September 2003, are major landmarks in the sustainable 
development agenda. However, the main challenge currently facing Parties is the 
development of NBFs to implement the Protocol. The sheer diversity of this study has come 
at the right time to assist countries with their national processes. 
Since its adoption the Protocol has received remarkable support from all partners. The 
number of Parties to the Protocol continues to grow, and currently stands at 135. This 
is a clear sign of the confidence the global community places in the Protocol. It is also a 
recognition of the need for international cooperation in ensuring the safe transfer, handling 
and use of Living Modified Organisms resulting from modern biotechnology.
The biggest challenge facing many developing countries in implementing the Protocol and 
other Conference of the Parties-Meeting of the Parties (COP-MOP) decisions is the lack of 
human resource, institutional and technological capacities in biosafety. In Curitiba, at the 
third MOP a new spirit of consensus and cooperation on issues related to biosafety was 
born opening a new era for the implementation of the objective of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. This new phase in the implementation of this innovative unique legal instrument 
calls for a new era in the cooperation of the Convention and its financial mechanism.
The recent historic COP-MOP decision on the detailed requirements for documentation 
accompanying shipments of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) intended for direct use as 
food or feed, or for processing to foster transparency and predictability in the international 
trade of genetically modified commodities and boost public confidence in the international 
biosafety system can only become operational if the necessary capacity-building activities 
are put in place. Capacity-building experiences, as documented by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP)-Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects, can help 
countries to acquire the necessary experiences and use them effectively. 
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The development and implementation of NBF projects have made an immense contribution 
to the development process at the national level to sustain the Cartagena Protocol. Our deep 
appreciation goes to our development partners through the GEF for the support given to: 
ÿ More than 130 countries that have completed or are about to complete developing 
their NBF;
ÿ 12 countries that are in the process of implementing their NBFs with support 
provided through UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme, and the 
World Bank; and
ÿ More than 139 countries are being assisted, through UNEP-GEF, to build their 
capacities in order to effectively participate in the Biosafety Clearing-House.
I would like to thank the Global Environment Facility and its implementing agencies for 
their support. The GEF is currently the single largest donor for biosafety capacity-building 
activities. According to the recent survey carried out by the United Nations University 
Institute of Advanced Studies, the GEF has, over the last five years, invested close to US$60 
million in biosafety capacity-building projects. This accounts for more than 40% of the total 
bilateral and multilateral funding assistance for biosafety. It is also gratifying to note that 
of the US$3.13 billion for the fourth GEF replenishment over the next four years, more than 
US$80 million will be spent on biosafety projects. I welcome this renewed support and 
commitment from the GEF under the leadership of the new CEO and Chairman to establish 
a vibrant partnership with the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Protocol. This will 
go a long way in assisting Parties to build the capacities necessary to enable them to fulfill 
their obligations under the Protocol. 
In my capacity as the Executive Secretary I look forward to an enhanced phase of 
collaboration between the Secretariat and its financial mechanism during the new phase of 
the GEF.
Ahmed Djoghlaf
Executive Secretary
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity
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Executive Summary
i. This study looks at the 124 countries that participated in the UNEP-GEF Project for 
Development of National Biosafety Frameworks (NBF), hereinafter referred to as the 
NBF development project, as well as the 8 countries that participated in the UNEP-GEF 
demonstration projects for the implementation of the NBFs, hereinafter referred to as the 
8 demonstration implementation projects, focussing on a comparative analysis of their 
experiences in order to draw out lessons and best practices applicable to other global 
initiatives for implementation of MEAs. These projects are implemented by UNEP under 
the GEF Initial Strategy for assisting countries to prepare for entry into force of the CPB. 
ii. The NBF Development Project started in June 2001 and by June 2006 124 countries had 
joined the project. By 31 December 2006, 84 countries had completed their draft NBF; 
the remaining countries are expected to complete their NBFs by the end of the project in 
December 2007. All the eight demonstration projects were completed by the end of 2006. 
The process of developing an NBF
iii. This paper looks at how each country participating in the NBF project used a process 
of knowledge mapping, adapted to its own particular social, political, environmental 
and development situation. Using an iterative learning process, countries collected 
and analysed information on biotechnology and biosafety within the context of their 
development priorities, and refined and developed their ideas about the different 
components of the NBF. This iterative process led to a map of the NBF that is dynamic, 
and evolves in light of experience as systems are established and become operational. 
The actual NBF produced by each country is therefore tailored to their own special 
needs and priorities.
Why did countries develop an NBF
iv. The 132 countries around the world that joined the UNEP-GEF NBF Projects in order 
to develop and implement their national biosafety frameworks did so for reasons that 
included both national development priorities and international obligations. Many 
countries saw biotechnology and biosafety as being integral to their national development 
planning priorities, particularly for sustainable development. For some countries, the 
primary reason for joining the project was to have access to funds from UNEP-GEF for 
capacity building activities. In most of these countries, the process of developing the NBF 
resulted in an increased awareness of the importance of biosafety and the potential of 
biotechnology for development. Thus these countries were able to integrate biosafety into 
their national development planning processes. Similarly, in those countries where the 
initial impetus for joining the NBF development project was to enable them to comply 
with the CPB, the process of collecting and analysing information helped to highlight the 
importance of biosafety as a sustainable development issue. 
I.
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NBF: the policy context
v. Participating countries chose to develop national policies that address biosafety in a 
variety of forms, depending on a country’s national priorities. Some chose to develop 
a stand-alone policy on biosafety, whilst others formulated a combined policy on 
biotechnology and biosafety. Some policies were part of wider policies on biodiversity 
conservation and environmental protection, trade related issues, biosecurity and 
quarantine, or within the overall context of sustainable development or Agenda 21.
NBF: the regulatory regime
vi. A number of countries had some form of regulatory regime (i.e. either primary or secondary 
instruments) in place before they started their NBF projects. However, most countries that 
started work on their NBF did so without any pre-existing regulatory regime for biosafety. 
Many of these countries without a pre-existing biosafety regime decided to select a level 3 
primary legal instrument, created under delegated authority. The choice of a level 3 primary 
legal instrument enabled countries to build on existing and functional legal systems in order 
to promulgate a legal basis for regulating GMOs within a short time-frame, allowing them 
to work with a legal instrument that could be reviewed and revised easily. 
vii. Other countries without a pre-existing biosafety regime decided to adopt a level 1 
biosafety law as the primary legal instrument for a variety of reasons. These included 
lack of a suitable existing law that could serve as a ‘home’ for a level 3 biosafety legal 
instrument; political support that enabled a level 1 law to be approved relatively quickly; 
And a lack of existing laws that adequately address or recognise the importance of 
biotechnology and biosafety.
NBF: the institutional set-up
viii. The proposed institutional setups for the National Competent Authority (NCA) n the 
different NBFs include: a single NCA receiving and processing applications; or more 
than one NCA, each with Sectoral responsibilities and with either a single window or 
multiple windows for receipt of applications for GMOs. In the draft NBFs in all regions, 
the proposals for the risk assessment setup usually assign that responsibility to the 
NCA or overall biosafety body, with advice from either an ad-hoc scientific advisory 
body, or an established advisory committee. 
NBF: Addressing Article 23 of the CPB
ix. Countries have addressed Article 23of the Cartagena Protocol on public awareness, 
education and participation in different ways, depending on each country’s particular 
social, political and economic situation. The main way, in which the public has been 
involved has been through involvement in the process of developing the NBF, for 
example through participation in the NCC. On of the main areas of focus for project 
activities have been on public awareness and education activities. 
x. In those countries that have completed their NBFs, the main provisions for promoting 
participation by stakeholders in Biosafety Decision-making are consistent with Article 23. 
Public consultation on GMO activities is included in all NBFs. These activities not only 
include applications for permits for environmental release or importation, but can also 
involve public participation in biotechnology research. In many countries, the public are 
invited to make submissions on applications at an early stage of the decision-making 
process; in many countries, this is enshrined in the biosafety regulatory instrument.
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Implementing the NBF
xi. In all the countries participating in the NBF development project, the long term aim is to 
translate the NBF into practical and workable systems, and as countries complete their 
NBF, they have started to do this. The process of translation is backed up by government 
commitment which has been demonstrated in a number of ways: by approval of the 
NBF, approval of the biosafety policy in the NBF, and by promulgation of the biosafety 
regulatory instrument by the appropriate body. Most countries that are Parties to the 
CPB have turned to the GEF for further assistance in order to implement their NBF.
Regional Cooperation 
xii. The importance of regional cooperation is recognised by many countries in all regions. 
However, one of the key lessons emerging from the projects is that regional cooperation 
has to be country driven and not in response to an external agenda. Therefore, for 
most countries, initial attempts at regional cooperation have taken the form of regional 
meetings to discuss potential areas for collaboration. 
 
Some lessons from development of NBFs 
xiii. The comparative analysis of the experiences of countries developing their NBFs under 
the UNEP-GEF project highlight some key lessons that will be relevant to future 
capacity building activities in biosafety as these countries start to implement their NBFs: 
ÿ  The most important lesson emerging from the experiences is that Biosafety is a 
sustainable development issue, and that it cannot be considered in isolation from a 
country’s development priorities. 
ÿ Recognition of biosafety as a sustainable development issue means that the 
development of the NBF, and particularly the resultant product i.e. the national 
biosafety framework, must be responsive to national needs and priorities in order 
to promote sustainability of the NBF.
ÿ The importance of a country-driven process in preparing the NBF - the strong 
emphasis on this principle throughout the project has promoted a strong sense 
of national ownership, illustrated by the support from government in many 
of the countries to, not only seek outside assistance for capacity building for 
implementation of their NBF, but also to commit substantial government resources 
to both setting up the necessary systems and to maintain them on an on-going basis 
through financial allocations in the national budget for recurrent costs.
ÿ An inclusive approach is needed in order to ensure the involvement of all 
stakeholders; this is crucial if the NBF is to be accepted by all parties within the 
country. This will not only help ensure support for the implementation of the NBF, 
but will also help promote the sustainability of the achievements.
xiv. The experiences of the NBF Development project also highlight the commitment of 
the countries participating in the project to biosafety and the CPB: 92 out of the 124 
countries in the project are already Parties to the Protocol and another most of the other 
countries are completing their national procedures for ratification. The NBFs not only 
provide the necessary legal instruments and other systems for implementation of the 
CPB, but the process of preparation of the NBF has started to build national capacity 
for effective implementation of the Protocol; this will need to be sustained through both 
externally funded and nationally supported capacity building efforts. 
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 Introduction
1. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), adopted in January 2000, establishes rules 
and procedures for the safe handling, transfer, and use of living modified organisms 
(LMOs). The CPB focuses on the transboundary movement of LMOs, both those to 
be introduced into the environment and those to be used directly as food, feed or for 
processing. 
2. The CPB, recognizing the need for capacity building for developing countries to 
enable them to make informed decisions on LMOs, designated the GEF as the financial 
mechanism for its implementation. In 2000, the GEF Council adopted an Initial Strategy 
for assisting countries to prepare for the Protocol’s entry into force. 
3. Under this strategy, the GEF funded the NBF Development project, implemented by 
UNEP and with national projects executed by designated government agencies in each 
country. The main objective of this project is to prepare countries for the entry into force 
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The major components of the project include:
1) Development of National Biosafety Frameworks (NBF) in participating countries; 
and 
2) Promotion of regional and sub-regional collaboration and exchanges of experience 
on biosafety.
4. The NBF Development Project started in June 2001 and by June 2006 124 countries had 
joined the project. By 31 October 2006, 77 countries had completed their draft NBF, and 
a further 30 countries have draft NBFs under review, whilst the remaining countries are 
at various stages of project implementation, depending upon when they started project 
activities. It is expected that over 80% of all participating countries will have completed 
their NBFs by the end of December 2006; the remaining countries are expected to 
complete their NBF by the end of the project in December 2007. 
ÿ The UNEP-GEF Biosafety Unit manages 8 of the 12 GEF-funded Demonstration 
Projects on Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks (NBFs) in Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, China, Cuba, kenya, Namibia, Poland and Uganda. These 8 countries 
finished their Pilot Projects, which resulted in draft NBFs, in 1999. The demonstration 
projects started in September 2002 and were set to last around 3 years, with budgets 
ranging up to 1 M US$. Five of the 8 projects were completed by the end of mid-2006, 
and the remaining 3 will be completed by the end of the 2006; 
ÿ In addition, the UNEP-GEF Biosafety unit manages a GEF-funded global project for 
139 countries to build capacity for effective participation in the Biosafety Clearing-
House (BCH). The lessons emerging from the UNEP-GEF BCH global project have 
not been included in the study at this time.
5. This study looks at the 124 countries in the NBF development project, as well as the 
8 demonstration projects, focussing on a comparative analysis of their experiences in 
order to draw out lessons and best practices applicable to other global initiatives for 
implementation of MEAs.
III.
7A  c o m p A r A t i v e  A n A l y s i s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e s  A n d  l e s s o n s  f r o m  t h e  U n e p - G e f  B i o s A f e t y  p r o j e c t s
 Conceptual Framework 
6. This paper begins by looking at the development of an NBF under the project as a 
process of knowledge mapping; the knowledge mapping process was outlined in the 
project document prepared by each participating country, and in the toolkit produced 
by the global project team. The mapping process recommended for all participating 
countries consists of five steps:
1) A stocktaking exercise to collect information and data on the current status of 
biosafety and biotechnology within the country, including human and institutional 
resources;
2) Analysis of the data and information with participation by all stakeholders;
3) Storage of the data so that it is readily available to stakeholders and can be used in 
the future to implement the NBF;
4) Further analysis and processing of information to determine priorities for the NBF;
5) Preparation of the NBF through a consultative process.
7. These steps in the knowledge mapping process for the development of an NBF 
are illustrated in Figure 1. The process used by countries participating in the NBF 
development project, helps them to:
ÿ Carry out a stocktaking exercise as the first step in the development of the NBF in 
order to ensure that the process of developing the NBF builds on existing efforts in 
the country and that the final product reflects national needs and priorities;
ÿ Ensure that all relevant stakeholders are consulted from the beginning of the 
process and that they help to determine the final outcome;
ÿ Develop an NBF that is consistent with the development priorities of the country;
ÿ Utilize national expertise in all fields related to biosafety and biotechnology rather 
than relying solely on external advice and expertise;
ÿ Translate the resulting map into practice through the development of the national 
biosafety framework or NBF (Box 1). The experiences of the eight demonstration 
project illustrate how the translation of the map into action works out in practice.
IV.
Box 1: A national biosafety framework or NBF is “a combination of policy, legal, administrative 
and technical instruments that are developed to ensure an adequate level of protection in the 
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern 
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health”.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHASE THREE:
(Months 13-18 of project)
Preparation of draft
National Biosafety
Framework
Sign National Project document
Appoint full-time NPC
Establish NCC
PHASE ONE:
(Months 1-6 of project)
Preparatory Activities &
Gathering Information
PHASE TWO:
(Months 7-12 of project)
Analysis &
Consultation
Surveys of:
Existing status of
biotechnology &
LMOs
Relevant legislation Regional
mechanisms for
harmonisation
Other issues as
identified by country
Programmes for safe
use of biotechnology
Biosafety Database;
roster of national
experts
National workshop for stakeholders to: review findings, identify
gaps and needs, and to decide priorities for NBF
Training workshops on different NBF
components as required
Awareness workshops for target
groups
Stakeholder workshop to identify
key components of NBF
Prepare draft of National
Biosafety Framework
Regional & Sub-Regional
Workshops to assist in
NBF process and content
Stakeholder workshop
to discuss draft and final
components of NBF
Current status of
biotechnology
Existing legislation Regional mechanisms for
harmonisation
Existing capacity
building
Inventories of:
Figure 1: Suggested Flow Chart for National Project to develop National Biosafety Framework
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8. Each country participating in the NBF project adapted this process of knowledge 
mapping to its own particular social, political, environmental and development 
situation. Thus the resulting NBF produced by each country was tailored to that 
country’s particular situation within a common framework; this common framework 
can be seen as a knowledge map consisting of five inter-related components (Figure 2). 
9. The concept of the NBF as a knowledge map provides a framework of analysis for this 
paper in discussing the experiences of the countries in developing and implementing 
their NBFs. The five inter-dependent components of the NBF provide countries working 
with the NBF development project with a guide to set up the systems necessary not only 
to comply with the requirements of the CPB, but also to ensure that the systems put 
in place are tailored to national needs and priorities for sustainable development. The 
same concept also applies to the eight demonstration implementation projects as they 
worked on operationalizing the five components of their NBF.
10. The framework of analysis used in this paper is based on the following key elements of 
the NBF:
ÿ The rationale for developing the NBF in the first place;
ÿ The process used by countries to develop their NBF;
ÿ The policy framework within which the NBF will operate;
ÿ The regulatory regime proposed for managing LMOs;
ÿ The institutional set up proposed for managing LMOs;
ÿ How the NBF addresses issues of public participation (Article 23 of the CPB);
ÿ How the NBF addresses socio-economic issues (Article 26 of the CPB);
ÿ How countries have gone about translating the knowledge map of their NBF into 
action by setting up systems to have the NBF up and running;
ÿ How countries have addressed issues of regional cooperation.
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Figure 2: The components of a National Biosafety Framework (NBF)1
1 Based on the UNEP-GEF NBF Development Project toolkit, module 3(i) on regulatory regimes.
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Figure 2: The components of a National Biosafety Framework (NBF)2
2 Based on the UNEP-GEF NBF Development Project toolkit, module 3(i) on regulatory regimes.
A National Biosafety Policy could either be:
 A stand-alone policy on biosafety;  or
 Part of a policy or policies on
o Biotechnology;
o Agricultural production;
o Food production and/or food safety;
o Biosecurity and/or quarantine;
o Biodiversity conservation;
o Environmental protection;
o Science & Technology;  or
o Sustainable development.
A Regulatory Regime that
comprises:
Legislation, laws, acts, regulations, decrees,
or guidelines, etc. that may include, for
example, the following elements:
 General Provisions:
• Objective
• Scope
• Definition of terms
• Institutional arrangements
•  General Obligations
 Operational Provisions
• Contained use
• Experimental environmental release
• Placing on the
market/commercialisation (including
food and feed)
• Import/export/transit
• Decision-making Procedures
• Mechanisms for public participation
 Other elements
• Information & public participation
• Monitoring
• Enforcement
• Offences and penalties
• Confidentiality
• Liability and redress
• Transition period
• Labelling & traceability
An Administrative
System that includes:
• The Competent
Authority/ies responsible
for receiving and handling
requests for permits
(import, export, domestic
use, including placing on
the market, intentional
introduction into the
environment, field trials,
contained use, transit, etc.)
• The system(s) /
procedure(s) for handling
notifications and requests
for permits
• The system(s) for Risk
assessment
• The system(s) for
Decision-making
• Meeting obligations
under the Biosafety
Clearing-House (BCH) and
national participation in the
BCH
Mechanisms for
public
awareness,
education and
participation
• Public access to
information on GMOs
• Public involvement
in the decision-making
process for GMOs
• Awareness and
Education
• Informing public
about the means of
public access to the
Biosafety Clearing-
House
Systems for follow up, including:
• Monitoring for environmental effects and effects on human,
animal or plant life or health;
• Enforcement to ensure compliance
• Offences and Penalties
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Current status of countries in the NBF 
Development and Implementation Projects
Table 1: The current status of NBFs in countries working with the UNEP-GEF projects
Region Countries that have completed their NBF (84)
Countries implementing 
their NBF
Advanced draft of 
NBF prepared
Still working on 
NBF
Africa Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Congo 
Republic of, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo (27 countries)
The NBF projects were 
completed in 2006 in:
Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia 
and Uganda 
Egypt, Mauritius, Tanzania 
and Tunisia (all will 
commence implementation 
projects in late 2006)
CAR, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Guinea Bissau (5) 
Angola, Chad, Cape 
Verde, Eritrea, 
Libya, Morocco, 
Sao Tome & 
Principe Zimbabwe 
(8) 
Asia-Pacific Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Korea DPR, Korea R. 
of, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Vanuatu, 
Viet Nam, Yemen (26 countries)
China – completed its NBF 
project in Dec 2005.
Viet Nam and Cambodia 
have started their 
implementation projects in 
August 2006; Tajikistan will 
start in early 2007.
Cook Islands, 
Kiribati, Nepal, 
Palau, Thailand 
(5)
Fiji, Marshall 
Islands, 
Micronesia, Nauru, 
Solomons, Tuvalu 
(7)
CEE Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Malta, Moldova, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey (16 
countries)
The NBF projects were 
completed in:
Bulgaria (March 2006) and 
Poland (August 2005)
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Moldova 
and Slovakia will start 
implementation in late 
2006.
Azerbaijan, Serbia 
(formerly Serbia 
& Montenegro), 
Ukraine (3) 
Bosnia is currently 
preparing its 
project proposal 
for development of 
its NBF.
LAC Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, 
Venezuela (15 countries)
Cuba completed its project 
in September 2006.
Guyana, Jamaica, 
Haiti (3)
Trinidad and 
Tobago, St. 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, 
Belize (4)
V.
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  Experiences from countries in developing and   
  Implementing their NBF
Why did countries develop an NBF 
11. The 120+ countries around the world that joined the UNEP-GEF NBF Projects in order 
to develop and implement their national biosafety frameworks did so for a variety of 
reasons that included both national development priorities as well as international 
obligations. These reasons are so intermingled that it would be impossible to single out 
any one reason for joining the NBF project. Some countries joined because they were 
either Parties to the CPB or had signalled their intention to ratify the Protocol by signing 
it. Many countries joined the NBF projects primarily because they saw the NBF as a 
way to ensure that they were able to develop biotechnology in a sound and sustainable 
manner. The range of reasons for developing an NBF is illustrated by the case of the 
Caribbean countries (Box 2); these experiences o are shared by many of the countries in 
other regions of the world.
Box 2: Caribbean countries decided to develop NBFs for the following reasons:
ÿ to comply with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
ÿ to set trade in modern biotechnology products in legal and policy frameworks which promote 
sustainable development, with emphasis on the safe use of biotechnology through systems for 
minimizing the potential of threats to sustainable livelihoods, human health and the environment, 
including biodiversity.
ÿ to produce an enabling environment for the development of biotechnology to enhance economic 
development.
ÿ to integrate biosafety relating to modern biotechnology with areas such as food safety, health, 
invasive species, environment and consumer rights and protection. 
12. Many countries saw biotechnology and biosafety as being integral to their national 
development planning priorities, particularly for sustainable development. As a result, 
many developing countries started to adopt modern genetic modification technologies 
in the late 1980s and developed regulations to manage GMOs. Those that later joined 
the UNEP-GEF NBF projects, included: 
ÿ In Asia – China joined the NBF demonstration project in order to implement its 
draft NBF developed under the Pilot project of UNEP/GEF. China recognised the 
importance of managing the safe application of GM technology across different 
sectors, and the value of addressing gaps in their existing regulations on GMOs, 
with a clear division of areas of responsibilities between the two national competent 
authorities (NCAs) to make the NBF truly workable; 
The Philippines, Iran, Syria, and Indonesia, which had all developed draft 
regulations or guidelines for biosafety, joined the NBF project in order to review 
and revise these regulatory instruments in light of the CPB;
ÿ In Africa - South Africa is the only country in Africa that had on its own developed 
regulations for the development of biotechnology. South Africa joined the 
project with the intention of improving on its public participation and awareness 
mechanisms. Ghana and Nigeria had initiated the development of non-binding 
guidelines to regulate their scientific institutions. Cameroon, kenya, Namibia and 
VI.
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Uganda started to implement their NBFs, which were produced under the Pilot 
Biosafety Enabling Activity project funded by GEF and implemented by UNEP. 
These countries saw themselves as likely recipients of GMOs rather than producers 
of GMOs. Therefore the initial impetus for these countries was to establish systems 
and mechanisms (under the implementation project) to manage the international 
movement of GMOs in, across and out of their countries, and the safe release of 
GMOs into their environment, without causing adverse effects on the environment, 
humans and animals. Egypt, participated in the Pilot project to develop draft a 
NBF in order to regulate both transboundary movement of GMOs and its own 
biotechnology sector. Egypt will begin to implement its draft NBF in late 2006 
under the GEF Interim Strategy for Biosafety;
ÿ In Latin America – Cuba joined the implementation project as a progression from 
the Pilot project, to provide the country with resources to reinforce the national 
system for inspection, enforcement and monitoring and to develop implementing 
regulations to make their Decree Law 190/99 on Biological Safety operational as 
well as in line with the Cartagena Protocol; 
ÿ In CEE – Bulgaria and Poland moved to the implementation project to make their 
draft NBFs, which were developed under the UNEP/GEF Pilot project workable 
and reflective of their changing political situation – entry into the EU. Being a new 
EU member, the implementation project provided Poland with an opportunity to 
harmonise its GMO Act 2001 with EU Directives and Regulations. Poland was also 
able to enhance its capacity to undertake GMO detection and monitoring under the 
implementation project. Bulgaria similarly focused much of its activities under the 
implementation project on the development of a regulatory regime, which would 
be consistent with EU Directives and regulations, in preparation of their entry into 
the EU in 2007.
13. Where the rationale for developing an NBF focussed initially on GMOs as a 
development issue, the national debates on biotechnology and biosafety soon brought 
about an awareness of the need to ratify the CPB as an international instrument to 
manage transboundary movement of LMOs, e.g. the Philippines (Box 3). 
Box 3:  Experiences of the Philippines – The Philippines’ National Agenda for Sustainable 
Development for the 21st Century (PA 21) provides the policy framework of the country’s strategy 
for sustainable development. In 2001, the Presidential Policy Statement on Modern Biotechnology 
reiterated the government policy of promoting the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology 
and its products as one of several means to achieve and sustain food security, equitable access to 
health services, sustainable and safe environment and industry development.
The first biotechnology regulatory system in the ASEAN region was established in the Philippines as 
a result of the recommendations from the scientists asking the national government to formulate a 
national policy on biosafety, and create a technical body to draft guidelines to ensure that experiments 
using GMOs do not pose unacceptable risks to human health and the environment. The first guidelines 
for biosafety were promulgated in October 1990 as Executive Order (EO 430), which established the 
National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. These and other subsequent guidelines issued 
in 1991, 1998, and 2002, were incorporated into the NBF, which was finalised in 2004 on completion 
of the NBF project. The NBF, which was issued as Executive order (EO) 514 in April 2006, is seen as 
supporting the safe use of biotechnology in order to promote sustainable development objectives as 
stated in the PA 21. The country, as an importer and potential exporter of LMOs, has also recognised 
the importance of the CPB as an international instrument to manage the transboundary movement of 
LMOs and has completed national processes for ratification with approval by both the President and 
the Senate, after extensive public hearings.
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14. For some countries, the primary reason for joining the project was to have access to funds 
from UNEP-GEF for capacity building activities. In most of these countries, the process 
of developing the NBF resulted in an increased awareness of the importance of biosafety 
and the potential of biotechnology for development. Thus these countries were able 
to integrate biosafety into their national development planning processes. However, a 
small number of countries were not able to mainstream biosafety into their development 
priorities and the NBF project has failed to make progress in these countries.
15. Similarly, in those countries where the initial impetus for joining the NBF development 
project was to enable them to comply with the CPB, the process of collecting and 
analysing information helped to highlight the importance of biosafety as a sustainable 
development issue. As a result, by the end of their NBF projects, the governments had 
started to see biosafety within the context of their national development plans, e.g. 
Samoa (Box 4) and the Caribbean (Box 2).
Box 4: Why did countries decide to develop an NBF?
Samoa recognised that biotechnology can offer potential benefits for both subsistence and 
commercial agriculture and fisheries - key sectors to its economy.  Modern biotechnology 
however, is a relatively new phenomenon, so while recognising that GMOs as products of 
modern biotechnology may have development benefits, Samoa also recognised that there are 
unknown and potential risks of GMOs to its biodiversity, upon which its agriculture and fisheries 
sectors are based.  To realise the benefits of modern biotechnology while safeguarding its 
biodiversity, and taking into account socio-economic considerations, capacity building in the area 
of biosafety was seen as a priority.
Samoa’s Cabinet approval to ratify the CPB in May 2002 was underpinned by a need to build 
its capacity through the development of a National Biosafety Framework, to ensure that safety 
measures are put in place for managing importation of GMOs, and for safe use of biotechnology.  
The NBF also assist Samoa comply with the Protocol.
The Cartagena Protocol 
16. In many countries, the primary reason for joining the NBF Development project, at least 
at the start of their project, was to comply with their obligations under the CPB to enable 
them to ratify the Protocol. This is illustrated by the experiences of countries from all the 
regions as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Status of Ratification of the CPB in countries participating in the UNEP-GEF NBF projects
Total AFR AP CEE
countries in NBF project 124 39 37 20
countries in NBF project that are Parties to the CPB 91 28 27 17
countries in NBF project that are Parties to the CPB and ratified before they joined project 22 5 6 3
countries in NBF project that signed the CPB before they joined project 63 21 15 10
countries in NBF project that signed the CPB before they joined project and have since ratified the 
CPB 48 17 11 10
countries that joined the NBF project before signature or ratification of the CPB 102 34 30 17
countries that joined the NBF project before signature or ratification of the CPB and that are now 
Parties to the CPB (1 November 2006) 69 23 21 14
countries in Demonstration project 8 4 1 2
countries in Demonstration project that are Parties to the CPB 8 4 1 2
countries in Demonstration project that signed the CPB before they joined project 8 4 1 2
countries in Demonstration project that signed the CP before they joined the project and have 
since ratified the CPB 8 4 1 2
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17. The following examples illustrate the high level of commitment to the ratification of the 
CPB in all regions, and the key role of the NBF Development project in fostering this 
process of ratification: 
ÿ Twenty-two countries, became Parties to the Protocol before joining the project, 
and used the project to develop the systems needed in order to comply with the 
CPB. Examples include from Asia-Pacific: Bhutan, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Nauru and 
Maldives; from Africa: Botswana, Djibouti, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali and Mozambique; 
CEE – Czech Republic, Belarus, Croatia; Caribbean - the Bahamas, Barbados and 
Antigua and Barbuda;
ÿ Sixty-three countries that were signatories to the Protocol joined the project in 
order to develop their NBF so as to be able meet the requirements of the Cartagena 
Protocol. Just over 75% or 48 countries have ratified the CPB during their project. 
Examples include:
t Asia: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, and Sri Lanka, ratified the CPB 
during the course of their project. One, the Philippines, ratified the CPB 
after completing its NBF. Two countries, Myanmar and Nepal, are close to 
completing their NBF and are also close to completing their national processes 
for ratification. One country, Republic of korea has not yet completed its 
national formalities for ratification; 
t Pacific: Palau and kiribati ratified the CPB during the course of their projects. 
The Cook islands, a signatory, is close to completion of NBF but with changes 
in governments, it is reviewing process for ratification; 
t Africa: 22 signatories ratified while participating in the project: Algeria, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape verde, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe; 
t CEE region, counties that were signatories and ratified CP during the project 
or shortly (couple of months) after the end of the project included: Lithuania, 
Macedonia former Republic of yugoslav, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Turkey. Two countries started the procedure for ratification during the project, 
and ratified it after the official end of the project: Estonia and Slovenia. These 
were the very first countries to complete their project in 2003, soon after the 
CPB came into force;
t In the case of the Caribbean, Saint Lucia ratified the CPB during the course of 
the NBF Development Project.
ÿ One hundred and two countries that joined the NBF project did so prior to 
ratification or signature. Two-thirds (69) of these countries have ratified the CPB 
during the course of their project. Examples include:
t Asia: Cambodia, Iran, korea DPR, kyrgyzstan, Laos PDR, Mongolia, Syria, 
Thailand, viet Nam and yemen. Two countries, kazakhstan and Lebanon, have 
completed their NBF but are yet to complete the national processes for ratification; 
t Pacific, Marshalls, PNG, and Tonga acceded during the course of their projects; 
Tonga completed its NBF and ratified during the course of its project, vanuatu 
completed its NBF but yet to complete process for accession, Micronesia is 
in the process of developing its NBF and yet to complete accession process, 
Tuvalu is in the process of developing its NBF and has completed its national 
procedures for ratification but has yet to notify the CBD Secretariat;
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t Africa these included: Cape verde, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Libya; 
t CEE region, many countries did not sign the CPB, but ratified it during 
the project: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Ukraine, Serbia and 
Montenegro. Malta, the only EU country that has not yet ratified the CPB, 
expects to do so soon. Georgia is also likely to ratify soon, once remaining 
obstacles are cleared.
ÿ All of the eight demonstration projects implementing their NBF had been 
signatories to the CPB prior to joining the implementation projects. All eight 
countries have ratified the Protocol during their project. 
How did countries develop their NBF 
18. The guidelines for the process of developing NBF provided by the NBF Development 
project helped countries to tailor the mapping process for the project to their own 
particular situation. Figure 3 illustrates the steps in the mapping exercise: the first 
step helped countries to establish a baseline for their national situation in terms of 
biotechnology and biosafety. The analysis and storage of the data, and the process of 
consultation (steps 2-4) helped countries to decide the priorities for their NBF. 
Figure 3: The development of an NBF as a Mapping process
19. The countries then drafted their NBFs (step 5); this provided a map to guide them in 
establishing and operationalizing the five components of their NBF. The translation 
of the NBF into practice is illustrated by the experiences of the eight demonstration 
projects as, by the end of the project, they were expected to have in place:
ÿ A policy on biosafety, either as a comprehensive policy in itself, or as parts of other 
relevant national policies;
ÿ An operational regulatory regime for biosafety, which is in line with the CPB and 
other relevant international obligations, as well as consistent with existing national 
sectoral laws;
ÿ Workable and transparent systems for handling applications for GMO release 
(including systems for administrative handling, risk assessment and decision 
making); 
ÿ Workable and transparent systems for public information and public participation 
in decision making;
ÿ A functional system for enforcement and post-release monitoring; and
ÿ A national website and/or a national Biosafety Clearing House (BCH).
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20. Thus countries with a high level of biotechnology R&D were able to bring together 
information on the country’s experiences with biotechnology research and regulation of 
GMOs through a process of consultation and analysis. Examples include:
ÿ Asia – Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand Syria, DPR korea, Republic of korea;
ÿ Africa – Ghana, Nigeria;
ÿ CEE – current EU member states Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, but 
also non-EU countries like Belarus, Serbia and Moldova;
ÿ Latin America – Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica. 
21. Other countries, such as Myanmar and PNG, with a relatively low level of activity in 
biotechnology, were able to document these activities, as well as the existing laws and 
regulations that pertained to the safe use of GMOs in order to be able to make informed 
decisions on the NBF (Box 5). 
 
Box 5:  Mapping the NBF: 
Myanmar
The Myanmar NBF project started project activities in mid-2004 with the appointment of 12 national 
consultants with expertise in the sciences (including biotechnology), management, forestry, and law, 
to carry out a survey of the “current situation of biotechnology and biosafety in the country”.  The 
survey gathered information on:
ÿ Policies related to biosafety, including sustainable development, environment, biodiversity, and 
science and technology;
ÿ Laws related to biosafety in sectors such as agriculture (pesticides, plant quarantine, fertilisers, 
seeds) livestock and fisheries, forestry, industry, public health, food, and science and technology;
ÿ How the relevant ministries administered the laws including food and drugs, plant quarantine, and 
border control;
ÿ The biotechnology resources in the country including research facilities, equipment, scientific 
personnel, and academic institutions offering educational courses related to biotechnology;
ÿ The status of conventional and modern biotechnology within the country, both within the public 
and private sectors.
Following the collation of this information, a series of national and regional public consultations were 
carried out throughout the country to decide on the priorities for the NBF.
Based on the results of this consultation, and analysis by members of the NCC, a draft NBF was 
prepared.  This includes a draft Law on Biosafety, which is currently under consideration by 
government.
Papua New Guinea
Local consultants carried out surveys in:
ÿ Policies of relevance biosafety including, national development, environment, agriculture and 
livestock, food security, health and population policies.
ÿ Existing legislations of relevance to biosafety and biotechnology categorised into legislations that 
impact on R&D (such as those in agriculture, environment, science and technology, research, 
health, etc), and on trade (such as quarantine, customs, food, etc.)
ÿ Existing institutions and programmes in risk assessment and management, including universities 
and National Agricultural Research Institutions.
ÿ Public perception of GMOs.
A series of four multi-stakeholder workshops decided on, and verified national priorities as articulated 
in the Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy, and decided on the choices for the regulatory regime, plus 
other components of the NBF.  The draft NBF includes a standalone Biotechnology and Biosafety Bill 
endorsed by government to be tabled in parliament during implementation phase of the NBF.
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22. A number of countries in Africa: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Congo, 
Gambia, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Togo, and United Republic of Tanzania, also went through a similar process of mapping.
23. The development of the NBF in these countries is best seen as an iterative learning 
process as countries collect and analyse information on biotechnology and biosafety 
within the context of their development priorities, and refine and develop their ideas 
about the different components of the NBF. This iterative process leads to a map of 
the NBF that is dynamic, and one that will evolve in light of experience as systems are 
established and become operational.
24. The actual NBF produced by each country was also tailored to their own special 
needs and priorities within the framework provided by the UNEP guidelines. Thus 
each NBF is different and there is no standard format or content for the NBFs. For 
example, in Asia, a number of countries used innovative approaches, or example, viet 
Nam developed its draft NBF as an Action Plan for biosafety whilst the one for the 
Philippines was in the form of an Executive Order that was eventually promulgated by 
the Government after signature by the President.
 
NBF: the policy context
25. A national policy that addresses biosafety is considered to be an integral part of an NBF. 
Such policies can take a variety of forms, depending on a country’s national priorities. 
These are not clear-cut divisions between the different policy contexts but indicate main 
groupings:
ÿ A few countries have chosen to develop a stand-alone policy on biosafety, although 
usually it is within a broader context of objectives such as biodiversity conservation, 
sustainable development or environment. Examples of a stand-alone biosafety 
policy include Slovenia and Bhutan;
ÿ Other countries have developed their NBFs under the umbrella of a policy on 
biotechnology and biosafety, or a science and technology policy, again within the 
context of broader development objectives such as sustainable development, food 
security, biodiversity conservation, agricultural development, etc. Examples of a 
combined biotechnology and biosafety policy include. Chile, Ghana, kazakhstan, 
DPR korea (see Box 6), Iran, Estonia, Sudan, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea;.
ÿ Other countries have developed their biosafety policy as part of policies on 
biodiversity conservation and environmental protection, that take into account issues 
such as invasive species, etc. Examples include some of the Caribbean countries 
such as Bahamas, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada; African countries such as Benin, 
Madagascar, and Mali; Asian countries such as Lebanon, Laos, and Jordan; Pacific 
countries such as Niue, Samoa and kiribati; CEE countries such as Armenia, Latvia 
and Lithuania; Latin American countries such as Ecuador and Peru;
ÿ Other countries have chosen to develop their policy on biosafety within the context 
of trade related issues. Examples include Lebanon, Republic of korea, Argentina, 
Mozambique, etc;
ÿ Some countries have focussed on issues related to biosecurity and quarantine in 
developing the context for their biosafety policy. Examples include Fiji, vanuatu, 
Palau, and Myanmar;
ÿ A number of countries have chosen the overall context of sustainable development 
or Agenda 21 as the setting for their biosafety policy, Examples include Indonesia, 
Philippines, Guinea, Liberia, Lesotho, Sudan, Tonga, Ecuador, and Czech Republic.
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26. In all countries, the policy context that provides the vision or rationale for the NBF has 
focussed both on the obligations and responsibilities under the Cartagena Protocol, and 
the potential of biotechnology in promoting the country’s development priorities. 
27. The areas of the Protocol addressed in policies include the main areas of focus of the 
Protocol:
ÿ Transboundary movement of LMOs (Objective and Scope of the CPB);
ÿ Protection of natural and agricultural biodiversity (Objective and Scope                   
of the CPB);
ÿ Protection of human health (Objective and Scope of the CPB);
ÿ Public participation, education and awareness (Article 23);
ÿ Capacity building for biosafety (Article 22). 
28. Most national policies on biosafety, across all regions, also include a formulation of the 
precautionary approach (Box 7) applicable to their national situation. 
Box 6: Biosafety and biotechnology policy for DPR Korea
The main objectives of biotechnology and biosafety policy are;
i) To ensure the safe use of biotechnology in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and to 
eliminate any risks that may be detected in the process of introducing the achievement of research 
into the various fields of the national economy and to thoroughly protect health of the people and 
conserve the biodiversity and ecological environment and,
ii) To make up the legal framework of the NBF and establish well-regulated administrative 
organization, supervisory body and risk assessment and data exchange body, so as to promote 
the scientific research, development and production of the modern biotechnology on the basis of 
biosafety guaranteed and at the same time contribute to ensuring maximal safety for movement, 
handling and use of GMOs including genetically modified crops.
Box 7: Example of how the Precautionary approach or principle is addressed: 
Indonesia’s Biosafety Policy – “Ensure an adequate level of biosafety in transfer, handling and use 
of LMOs which may have adverse effects on conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
taking into account risks to human health, and using the precautionary approach without putting 
constraints on the research and development of biotechnology in Indonesia.”
In the CEE – All non-EU CEE countries mention in their legal acts that their biosafety laws are based 
on the precautionary principle. Some EU member states do not refer to it so clearly (for example, 
Estonia does not mention precautionary principle in its biosafety law), but as this principle is the basis 
of EU legislation, and the EU legislation is directly applicable to EU member states, the precautionary 
principle is implicit for all member states. So, it could be summarized that all CEE countries use 
precautionary principle in their NBFs as one of the main basis.
Tanzania – One of the guiding principles for the NBF is the Precautionary Principle: “This shall be 
implemented through the decision-making system of the NBF, particularly in accordance with the 
procedure for risk assessment, risk management and evaluation of socio-economic risks.”
Caribbean – all the Caribbean countries incorporated the precautionary principle into their respective 
NBFs.
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Policy Development in demonstration project countries
29. Because of historical reasons, not all demonstration countries had a policy in biosafety 
in place when they embarked on implementing their NBFs. Although it was recognized 
that a policy could help to frame a regulatory regime for the safe use of biotechnology, 
experience in other countries has demonstrated that the development of national policy 
and regulatory frameworks do not need to proceed in tandem. 
30. China adopted a policy that promotes research and development of biotechnology, but 
at the same time, has control over research in genetic engineering, to ensure public and 
environmental health as well as to maintain ecological balance1. China’s policy on GM 
regulation is under the responsibility of the Joint Monitoring and Management Commission 
(JMM), which was established by the State Council (the highest governmental body in China). 
The JMM has a multi-stakeholder membership, which includes the highest representatives 
from ministries like Agriculture, Health, Commerce, Science and Technology, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the National Inspection and Quarantine 
Agency and the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). The primary 
responsibility of JMM is to coordinate the main functions of biosafety, including the review, 
approval and development of policies and regulations on GMO production, labelling, and 
the import/export of GMOs. During the course of the implementation project, China also 
embarked on the development of a comprehensive national strategy on biotechnology 
development encompassing a biosafety policy. This is probably a result of cognizance of the 
rapid growth of biotechnology as well as the vast area planted with GM crops in the country. 
The mission of this new strategy (policy) would be to ensure that biosafety would be an 
integral part of biotechnology development and application in the country. 
31. Apart from China, Namibia was one of the countries that had a policy for enabling 
the safe use of biotechnology (1999) when the Implementation project started. 
Although Cuba has neither a specific policy for biotechnology nor biosafety, it however 
had an Environmental Policy under Law 81 of the Environment (1997). Under the 
Environmental Policy the principles and regulations to protect the environment and at 
the same time achieve sustainable development were established. kenya and Uganda 
have each drafted a policy for biotechnology and biosafety under the present project. 
These were carried out in parallel with the development of the regulatory regime. 
However, because their Governments decided that a national policy had to be adopted 
before the approval of a Biosafety Bill, these decisions are still under consideration. 
The draft Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy of Uganda was developed with a vision 
to make Uganda a country that will utilise biotechnology safely and as a tool for 
sustainable national development in the context of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP), vision 2025 and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
32. Although Bulgaria did not have a policy on modern biotechnology, a national policy on 
co-existence of conventional, organic and GM crops was developed in February 2004. 
This policy, which was agreed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, has been 
presented to the Environmental Commission of the Bulgarian Parliament. The policy is 
based on economical, political, geographic, biological, social and ethical considerations 
for several groups of crops of economic importance. 
33. Cameroon has yet to develop a national policy on biotechnology and biosafety. 
However, the Cameroon Academy of Sciences has been recommended to undertake 
this task through the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation and other key 
ministries. No progress has been made thus far. 
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NBF: the regulatory regime
34. A number of countries in three different regions had some form of regulatory regime 
(i.e. either primary or secondary instruments) in place before they started their NBF 
projects; these consisted of guidelines, rules, regulations, decrees or laws (Box 8):
 
ÿ Asia –, Bangladesh (guidelines), Indonesia (Ministerial decree), Iran (regulations), 
Republic of korea (Biosafety law) Philippines (regulations), Sri Lanka (guidelines), 
Syria (guidelines), Thailand and viet Nam (guidelines);
ÿ CEE – Czech Republic (Act and Decrees of the Ministry of the Environment, Croatia 
(Act and secondary Regulations), Romania (Law and Governmental Ordinances 
and Orders), Estonia (Act and secondary Regulations), actually, all CEE countries 
had in place primary act or law and then secondary regulations or ordinances or 
decrees, there were no country with guidelines;
ÿ Latin America – Argentina (regulations).
35. In these countries, the regulatory instruments for GMOs had originally been developed 
in response to national priorities on biotechnology and biosafety (in the case of EU 
countries – a pre requisite for accession to the EU); these were reviewed and revised as 
part of developing their NBF in order to ensure consistency with the CPB and changing 
national priorities. 
Box 8: Examples of existing regulatory instruments prior to countries joining the NBF Development 
project
Croatia – their Nature Protection Act had some provisions about use of GMOs, but it was not fully 
in line with requirements of Cartagena protocol. Hence, new GMO Act was drafted and was adopted, 
together with secondary regulations.
Romania was the only country there GMOs were allowed to grow commercially. They had a 
comprehensive system in place, but it was amended to comply with the  requirements of the CPB and 
the EU.
Argentina – had a detailed system of administrative norms or rules issued by the NCA prior to joining 
the NBF project.
Philippines – was the first ASEAN country to initiate a biotechnology regulatory system with the 
issuance of a Presidential Order in 1990 to establish a national biosafety committee.  This committee 
subsequently issued two guidelines for work on GMOs in 991 and 1998.  In 2002, the Department of 
Agriculture issued an administrative order for the importation and release into the environment of plant 
products derived from modern biotechnology.  
Indonesia – the first regulations in the form of a ministerial decree, issued in 1994, were for the risk 
assessment of biotechnology product, with a subsequent initiatives on food labelling, food safety and 
field releases.
Republic of Korea – had already drafted overall national legislation on biosafety prior to joining the 
NBF project; these included sectoral departmental regulations on GMOs in a wide range of areas such 
as food labelling, field testing, monitoring, health related aspects, food standards, environmental 
impacts, risk assessment, etc.
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36. However, most countries that started work on their NBF had no pre-existing regulatory 
regime for biosafety prior to embarking on their NBF development project.
37. For the implementation projects, the status of NBFs in the 8 countries at the start of the 
project can be grouped into three categories: those with primary laws in place, those 
who drafted a new law and those who used an existing law to encompass biosafety. 
With the exception of Cuba, all other 7 countries have chosen to develop regulatory 
regimes, which regulate the process rather than the product. Because all genetically 
modified biological entities or exotics to the country are regulated in Cuba, it appears to 
have a combination of a process as well as product base for regulation.
Countries with Approved Primary Laws
38. When the Implementation projects started in Sept. 2002, only two countries had an 
approved Law in place. These were namely Cuba, which had a Decree Law 199/99 
on Biological Safety (1999) and Poland, a GMO Act 2001. Cameroon, which was in an 
advanced stage with its Law to govern Biotechnology (Law 2003/006) at the start of the 
Implementation project, had the Law approved in June 2003; less than a year after the 
Implementation project began. 
Country using Existing Law
39. Uganda was unique among the 8 because Uganda had initially opted not to develop a 
new Law, but to expand on its existing Science and Technology Law to include biosafety 
regulation. However, after more than two years into the Implementation project, it was 
advised by its Ugandan legal fraternity in a national consultation, that the biosafety 
regulations being drafted exceeded the legal statute of the Science and Technology Law. 
A new Biosafety Bill was therefore promulgated. 
Countries with New Draft Laws
40. All remaining 4 countries, namely Bulgaria, China, kenya, Namibia decided to draft 
a new comprehensive primary legislation. With the exception of Bulgaria, which has 
called its law the ‘GMO Act”, others, including Uganda, have chosen to name their 
legislation as “Biosafety Bill”. China is distinct in naming it as “Transgenic Biosafety 
Law”.
41. For the NBF Development project, the various types of legal instruments (Box 9) 
chosen by countries to regulate GMOs depended both on their previous experiences 
with regulating GMOs as well as their regulatory set up in relation to areas such as 
quarantine, biosecurity, science and technology, trade, food safety etc. The level of 
regulatory instrument (Box 9) chosen was also important and depended both on 
their pre-existing regulatory regime for biosafety as well as the existence of suitable 
regulatory instruments that could be used to cover biosafety regulations.
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Table 3: Level and type of primary regulatory instrument chosen by countries on completion of their NBF 
as of October 2006
Region # of NBFs completed Level of pre-existing legal 
instrument
Level of legal instrument 
selected in NBF
Africa 23 No pre-existing specific legal 
instruments for biosafety 
23 countries 
Level one: 21 countries
Level three 2 countries
Asia 18 Level one: 1 country Level one: 1 country
Level three none
Level three: 8 countries Level one: 2 countries
Level three 6 countries
No pre-existing specific legal 
instruments for biosafety 
9 countries
Level one: 6 countries
Level three 3 countries
Caribbean 4 No pre-existing specific legal 
instruments for biosafety 
4 countries
Level one: 4 countries
Level three none
Central and 
Eastern Europe
14 Level three: 12 countries Level one: 12 countries
Level three none
No pre-existing specific legal 
instruments for biosafety 
2 countries
Level one: 2 countries
Level three: none 
Latin America 8 Level three: 1 country Level one: 1 country
Level three none
No pre-existing specific legal 
instruments for biosafety 
Level one:4 countries
Level three 3 countries
Pacific 4 No pre-existing specific legal 
instruments for biosafety 
4 countries
Level one: 2 countries
Level three 2 countries
Box 9: Levels of regulatory instruments
The different types of instruments at the various levels of law-making can be categorised as follows:
Level 1: includes legal instruments approved by the legislative branch of government, such as a 
parliament, congress, legislature, or house of assembly, which are then promulgated with binding 
effect. 
Level 2: includes legal instruments that are created under delegated authority by an individual 
or group, who then present them back to the legislature for approval; these instruments are then 
promulgated with binding effect. 
Level 3: covers instruments that are created under delegated authority by an individual or group, but 
which do not need further approval by the legislature before promulgation that is binding.  
Level 4: comprises the work of the judicial branch; they include binding decisions on the interpretation 
of instruments in Levels 1-3 by courts or other adjudicators, and binding decisions creating law by 
courts.
Level 5: includes non-legally binding instruments that are created by an individual or group with 
delegated power without the need for further approval before promulgation.
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42. A number of countries without a pre-existing biosafety regime decided to select a level 3 
primary legal instrument; in Asia, these countries included Jordan, Lebanon, Maldives, 
and Bhutan; in Africa two countries, Tanzania and Mozambique chose a level 3 legal 
instrument for biosafety; in Pacific two countries, Samoa and vanuatu chose a level 3 
law (Box 10); as did four countries in Latin America, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
and venezuela. 
Box 10: Examples of countries choosing level 3 primary legal instrument in different regions:
Venezuela – The project elaborated a proposal for a national regulation on development, manipulation, 
transport and introduction into the environment of GMOs for the implementation of the CPB.
Mozambique – Biosafety regulatory regime consists biosafety regulations and guidelines describing 
the roles and procedures of the National Biosafety to be enacted by the Council of Ministers.
Vanuatu – The main legislative vehicle for putting the NBF in place is the Animal Importation and 
Quarantine Act and Plant Protection Act.  These Acts are currently being updated and merged into 
a Biosecurity Bill through activities of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC).  Biosafety is 
integrated with biosecurity in the Biosecurity Bill.  The NBF also calls for amendments of the Plant 
Protection Act and Environmental Management and Conservation Act to address conflicts, overlaps 
and gaps.
Bhutan – decided to formulate biosafety regulations for management of GMOs under an existing Act, 
the Food Act of Bhutan, 2005 as this Act provided for the promulgation of regulations on GMOs by the 
Minister of Agriculture.
Lebanon, which also started the NBF project without any pre-existing legal instruments on biosafety, 
on the other hand decided that the country needed some form of biosafety regulation urgently, 
particularly as a trading nation dependent on export and import of agricultural produce.  The NEA, with 
the backing of the NCC, and on the advice of their national consultant on legal issues, decided to opt 
for an interim By-law on biosafety, with the intention to develop a full biosafety law at some stage in 
the future, based on their experiences with the By-law.
Tanzania – The draft Environmental Management Bill provides for the regulation of development, 
handling and use of GMOs and products thereof. It proposes to empower the Minister responsible for 
Environment in consultation with sector Ministries to make regulations, issue guidelines and prescribe 
measures for the regulation of the development, handling, and use as well as the importation and 
exportation of GMOs and their products.
43. The reasons for choosing a level 3 primary legal instrument included:
ÿ Building on existing legal instruments so as to make best use of a functioning 
system;
ÿ Expediency - as a by-law or decree requires either ministerial or cabinet approval, 
and does not require amendment of an existing law and therefore parliamentary 
approval; 
ÿ A By-law or decree can therefore be promulgated fairly quickly and a country 
would have a legal basis for regulating GMOs within a short time-frame; 
ÿ In a rapidly changing scientific field, countries preferred to work with a legal 
instrument that could be reviewed and revised easily, leaving their options open for 
formulating a Level 1 legal instrument later if needed, after gaining experience with 
the level 3 measures.
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44. Other countries without a pre-existing biosafety regime decided to adopt a level 1 
biosafety law as the primary legal instrument; there are some interesting differences 
between the different regions in why and how these countries decided to go for a      
level 1 law (Box 11). Countries that chose to develop a level 1 biosafety law included 
most of the 25 African countries that have completed their NBF to date (Table 3); six 
countries in Asia: Cambodia, DPR korea, Tajikistan, kyrgyzstan, Laos PDR, Myanmar and 
Nepal; four countries in the Caribbean (Grenada, Dominica, the Bahamas, and Antigua and 
Barbuda); four in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Peru; two in the Pacific, 
Tonga and PNG; two in the CEE, Armenia and Georgia; and five countries in the Caribbean 
( Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada and Saint Lucia).
45. Their reasons for choosing a full biosafety law as the primary legal instrument included:
ÿ There were no suitable existing laws that could serve as a ‘home’ for a level 3 
biosafety legal instrument;
ÿ Their legislative systems enabled them to pass the level 1 law relatively quickly, 
especially with the political support of the government. For example, four of the 
countries that chose a full biosafety law have had the draft bill passed by their 
Parliament or Assembly within a year of completion of the NBF. In Cambodia, the 
parliament is still considering the draft bill although the Cabinet has approved the 
draft published in the NBF with some changes;
ÿ The drafting and approval of a full biosafety law was considered to be a sign of 
support not only from a Government Minister, but also from Parliament as a whole, 
strengthening ownership within the country and making it easier to implement the 
NBF;
ÿ There were no existing laws that adequately address or recognise the importance of 
biotechnology and biosafety in addressing national priorities such as food security 
and protection of biodiversity.
46. Some countries with pre-existing biosafety Level 3 legal instrument, such as Iran and 
Thailand, have opted for the option of drafting a new national biosafety law (Level 1) 
since they had considerable experience with implementing regulations for biosafety. In 
Africa, most of the countries that have published their draft NBFs have chosen a Level 
one law for the reason that this will enable them put in place a comprehensive law that at 
the same time will be dynamic, and can evolve with the development of the technology.
47. Others with a pre-existing biosafety regime, such as Philippines, Indonesia, viet Nam 
and Sri Lanka, decided to review and revise their existing legal instruments in order to 
develop a Level 3 legal instrument that is consistent with the CPB, but have all left the 
option open to develop a Level 1 biosafety Law as the primary legal instrument at some 
future date. In all countries that have drafted their regulatory instrument, the scope of 
the regulatory regime is, as a minimum, in accordance with the Cartagena Protocol, and 
covers transboundary movement – export, import and transit - referring either to LMOs 
(examples from Asia include Jordan, Lao PDR, kyrgyzstan, Cambodia) or to GMOs 
(examples from Asia include Bhutan, Maldives, viet Nam). The instruments also address 
procedures for food and feed products (FFP) in accordance with Article 11 of the CPB.
48. In addition, many of the draft instruments go beyond the CPB in accordance with 
national priorities to include issues related to the production of GMOs within the 
country such as: Regulation of biotechnology R&D (for example Iran and DPR korea, 
PNG); Contained use of GMOs; Field trials; Commercial release.
49. Box 12 on page 27 gives an example of types of secondary legislation developed during 
implementation.
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Box 11: Examples of countries choosing level 1 laws in different regions:
Georgia – did not have any legislation in place regulating LMOs prior to joiining the project. During the project, a 
draft law on ``Genetically Modified Organisms``was prepared, but it is still not adopted and is currently undergaing 
revision. Secondary legislation or sub-laws (statutory acts) are also being drafted; these include: Decrees of the 
Government on contained use, deliberate release into the environment and direct use as food or feed, guidelines for 
risk assessment; joint order of different ministers (Minister of Agriculture - guidelines for GMOs field and laboratory 
testing, on database of GMO Experts, on work of GMOs Scientific Commission”; etc ).
Albania –  there was no specific biosafety law, but there are many laws related to biosafety and biotechnology, 
which can be used and adapted: food safety, nature protection acts, etc. Albania had drafted a general nature 
protection law, consisting of couple of provisions about GMOs, and this law had been in Parliament for couple 
of years but has not been adopted because of these provisions. Their current proposal is to exclude GMOs from 
general law and draft a new special law for biosafety. This draft was done during the project, but it is under revision 
at the moment.
PNG – There was no existing legislation that dealt with biosafety prior to the UNEP-GEF project.  PNG opted for 
the development of standalone biosafety legislation, namely the “Biotechnology and Biosafety Bill”.  The Minister 
is given powers to develop Biosafety and Biotechnology Regulations under the Bill.  The driving force behind this 
option was the importance of biotechnology and biosafety in addressing food security and the lack of existing 
legislation that adequately covers the protection of biodiversity.  The scope covers all activities involving modern 
biotechnology.
Tonga – There was no biosafety legislation in place prior to the UNEP-GEF project.  Tonga opted for a standalone 
Biosafety Bill with regulations to regulate LMOs.  The draft NBF also proposes several statutory amendments to six 
existing laws: Aquaculture Management Act 2003, Fisheries Act 1989, Consumer Protection Act 2000, Business 
Licenses Act 2002, Public Health Act 1992, and Therapeutic Goods Act 2001.  The scope of the Biosafety Bill 
includes modern biotechnology techniques beyond the Protocol and covers all activities.
Caribbean – In the absence of an NBF catering for implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, all  
Caribbean countries submitting draft final NBFs to date reported an absence of laws that could be specifically 
applied to regulating trade in modern biotechnology, with particular emphasis on transboundary movement of 
LMOs and their potential threats to biodiversity. These countries considered alternatives to the NBFs catering for  
implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as amendments of several relevant laws which preceded the 
advent of the Protocol to make them applicable to its enforcement. The multiplicity of amendments envisaged was 
deemed legally undesirable and all countries agreed to develop new laws represented by the draft final NBFs which, 
among other things, will cater for implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
Rwanda – no laws explicitly address biosafety issues before the project; thus Rwanda committed itself in 
developing a National Biosafety Law.
Swaziland – Survey of the existing legislations revealed that they do not explicitly address modern biotechnology 
and Biosafety issues. A draft bill was therefore prepared under the NBF project.
Tajikistan, which started the NBF project without any pre-existing legal instruments on biosafety and with a 
relatively underdeveloped biotechnology sector and little experience with GMOs, decided to develop a full biosafety 
law because during the process of analysis and consultation, the NEA realised the importance of biosafety as a 
sustainable development issue.   The NEA also wanted to ensure the full support of the parliament or Majlis for 
implementing their NBF.
China – In the early 1990s, China had already implemented a very pragmatic approach to GM crop regulation. 
Regulations were basically product based with special attention given to the economic interest of a given 
application1. By 1993, China had already established a biosafety regulation, namely the ‘Safety Administration 
Regulation on Genetic Engineering’ under the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). This regulation 
established general principles, safety categories, risk assessment and risk management procedures, application 
and approval mechanisms and legal responsibilities2.   This was followed by a regulation on ‘Safety Administration 
Implementation Regulation on Agricultural Biological Genetic Engineering (1996)’ by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA). In May 2001, the State Council promulgated a new decree on biosafety, entitled the ‘Regulation on the 
Safety Administration of Agricultural GMOs’. This new Regulation replaced the 1993 Regulation issued by MOST. 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) then issued in 2002, three new implementing regulations under this decree to 
regulate biosafety management, trade and labeling of genetically modified (GM) agricultural products. Under the 
MOA, the biosafety management system for agricultural biotechnology applications comprises 3 channels, namely, 
the Technology System, Monitor and Management and Law and Regulation System, with involvement of multiple 
agencies and institutions and supported by numerous administrative regulations3. Monitor and management are at 
both the national and provincial levels. The Ministry of Public Health (MPH) also promulgated a new regulation to 
address GMO food safety in 2002. These regulations resulted in several important changes on regulatory oversight 
after commercialization.  However, despite the comprehensive framework, which was already in place, it was 
decided that a new primary law on biosafety would be drafted for China, under the leadership of SEPA.
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Box 12: Cuba: drafting secondary regulations:
Cuba has supplemented its Decree-Law 190 on Biological Safety with several complementing 
legislations. Some of these include Resolution 42.1999: Official List of Biological agents, Resolution 
8.2000: General Regulation on Biosafety, Resolution 103.2002: Regulation on the confined use of 
transgenic microorganisms and invertebrates, Resolution 112.2003: Regulation on the confined 
use of transgenic plants and animals, Resolution 76.2000: Regulation on Granting Biological Safety 
Authorizations and Resolution 2.2004: Regulation on Accountability and Control.
Box 13:  Examples of objectives and scope of regulatory instruments from different regions
Philippines –“The NBF shall apply to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures 
and guidelines and in making decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary 
movement, release into the environment and management of regulated articles.”
Estonia - The Estonian Act on Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms came into force on 
January 13, 1999 (Official Journal RT, I ,1999, 10, 151). 
The objective of the Act is to protect human health and the environment from the consequences of the release into 
the environment of GMOs, to ensure the safe use of genetic modification techniques and the development of such 
techniques in an ethically acceptable manner. The Act also aims to implement EC Directive 2001/18/EC.
Tanzania – The NBF applies to the research, development, handling, transit, contained use, transboundary movement, 
release or placing on the market of any GMO whether intended for release into the environment, for use as food, feed or 
processing, or a product of a GMO / product thereof that may have adverse environmental, human and animal health and 
socio-economic as well as ethical and cultural effects on the inhabitants of Tanzania.
PNG - The five objectives of the biosafety bill are: 
1.  To protect the health and safety of people and the environment, by identifying risks posed as a result of modern 
biotechnology, and by preventing, reducing and eliminating those risks through regulating genetically modified 
organisms; 
2.  To ensure that proper weight is given to both the long-term and short-term social, economic, environmental and 
equity considerations in deciding all matters relating to genetically modified organisms and to prevent threats posed 
by genetically modified organisms on the country’s unique biodiversity; 
3.  To protect and sustain the potential of natural and physical resources against threats posed by genetically modified 
organisms to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations, and safeguard the life-supporting 
capacity of air, water, land and eco-systems; 
4.  To avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effects of activities on the environment by regulating in an integrated, 
cost-effective and systematic manner, activities and dealings relating to genetically modified organisms; and 
5.  To ensure that dealings with genetically modified organisms are regulated in a way that is consistent with Papua 
New Guinea’s national interests.
Demonstration project countries:
The objective of the regulatory regimes for biosafety in all countries is consistent with the CPB: protection of human and 
animal health, and the environment. Although the CPB also mentioned ‘conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity’, 
not all countries have included this in their biosafety law. Biodiversity is not mentioned in the GMO Act of Bulgaria, Kenya 
and Poland. Uganda is the only country, which has included ‘the need to minimize the impact of international trade’ as 
one of its objectives. All 8 demonstration countries have chosen to regulate genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
covering a range of activities beyond the movement of GMOs across national boundaries. 
All 8 demonstration countries have expanded the scope of their regulatory regime to include research and development 
i.e. contained use and products of GMOs. Since a majority of GM products are food and feed, it is inferred that GM food 
and feed are regulated. Although food and feed safety are not mentioned specifically in their biosafety legislation, many 
countries have, however, chosen to regulate food and feed either by new regulations to be developed under the biosafety 
legislation or by amendments to existing laws/regulations on food and feed, which often are traditionally under the 
purview of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture, respectively.  Additionally, countries like Kenya and Uganda 
have involved the Bureau of Standards (which controls food/feed quality) to regulate food/feed safety.  
China, Namibia and Poland have included ‘production or manufacture’ to be covered by their law, whereas Cuba has 
added ‘biological agents and exotics’ to the scope of its Law 199/99. The official biological agents listed in Resolution 42 
are those that affect man, animals and plants. 
Uganda is exceptional in that the scope of its proposed Bill only covers confined and commercial releases of GMOs 
and import of GMOs for these two categories of releases. This means that contained use of GMOs is exempted from 
regulation, until they are ready for release.
50. Some examples of the objectives and scope of regulatory instruments from various 
countries, development and implementation, is given in Box 13; these are from countries 
with an active R&D programme in biotechnology as well as countries whose primary 
concern at present is to regulate imports but who are also interested in promoting 
domestic production of GMOs.
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NBF: the institutional set-up
51. In the draft NBFs in the different regions, the proposed institutional setups for the 
National Competent Authority (NCA) as required under Article 19 of the Cartagena 
Protocol include:
ÿ A single NCA receiving and processing applications; this is usually in consultation 
with a National Biosafety Committee or Commission (NBC) and line ministries, 
for example the option chosen by Lebanon (Ministry of Environment), Cambodia 
(Ministry of Environment), Samoa (Department of Environment and Conservation), 
Grenada, St Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda (the national biosafety coordinating 
body), Bahamas (BEST Commission), Argentina (the Secretary of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Fisheries and Food), Gambia (National Environment Commission), 
Ghana )National Biosafety Authority), Czech Republic (Ministry of Environment), 
Georgia (Ministry of Environment and Natural resources, Slovenia (Ministry of 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy);
ÿ The most common model is more than one NCA, each with Sectoral 
responsibilities. The receipt of applications for GMOs can be either through a:
t Single window for applications received by a central coordinating body and 
sent for processing to the relevant NCA - e.g. Iran, DPR korea, Myanmar;
t Multiple windows with applications received by the responsible government 
agencies, with coordination provided by NBC - e.g. Belarus, Estonia, Croatia, 
Latvia, Philippines (Box 14), Indonesia.
Box 14: Institutional set up proposed in NBF: an example from the Philippines 
The national focal point responsible for liaison with the Secretariat shall be the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. 
The following are identified as competent national authorities, responsible for performing the 
administrative functions required by the Protocol: 
ÿ The Department of Agriculture for biosafety decisions concerning plants and plant products 
derived from modern biotechnology, fisheries and other aquatic resources, domesticated animals 
and biological products used for animal husbandry or veterinary purposes and biological agents 
used for biocontrol;
ÿ The Department of Science and Technology, for biosafety decisions concerning research and 
development;
ÿ The Department of Health, for biosafety decisions concerning pharmaceuticals for humans that 
are not explicitly excluded under Article 5 of the Protocol, i.e. pharmaceuticals which are not 
addressed by other relevant international agreements or organizations;
ÿ The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, for biosafety decisions that concern 
regulated organisms intended for bioremediation, the improvement of forest genetic resources, 
and wildlife genetic resources, and applications of modern biotechnology with potential impact on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity;
ÿ The national focal point and the competent authorities are required to coordinate with the National 
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) in accordance with its mandate. For genetically 
modified organisms not falling under the jurisdiction of the competent authorities enumerated 
above, the NCBP shall designate the appropriate agency that shall act as such authority;
ÿ Biosafety Clearing House.  The NCBP Secretariat shall serve as the focal point for the BCH in 
coordination with the DENR-PAWB serving as the focal point for the Clearing House Mechanism 
(CHM) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
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52. In the draft NBFs in all regions, the proposals for the risk assessment setup usually 
assign that responsibility to the NCA or overall biosafety body, with advice from 
either an ad-hoc scientific advisory body, or an established advisory committee. The 
composition of this advisory body is often determined by the regulatory instrument 
and in some cases, NGO representation or regional expertise on advisory committees is 
allowed (e.g. Iran, Samoa, PNG, Niue).
Box 15: Institutional set up in demonstration project countries
Six of the eight countries in the demonstration project have chosen the Ministry of Environment as 
their National Executing Agency (NEA).  Kenya and Namibia are different in having the Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the Ministry of Education as their respective NEAs. The NEA for Uganda 
is the National Council for Science and Technology, which is under the ambit of the Ministry for 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development. 
Most countries have more than one National Competent Authority (NCA). Cameroon is the only 
country among the 8 that has one NCA, which is the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection 
(MINEP). Although Cameroon has only one NCA, MINEP works closely with other stakeholder 
Ministries like Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Livestock, Fishery and 
Animal Industry, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Higher Education and designated laboratories. On the 
other hand, Kenyan has as many as 6 NCAs. These are generally distributed among relevant Ministries 
and agencies like Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry, Health, Science and Technology, Environment 
(and Natural Protection, Water and Land) and Commerce, Bureau of Standards, National Environment 
Management Agency, Plant Health and Inspection Services, etc.
Bulgaria is an example where there is a clear division of responsibilities between two NCAs. The 
Ministry of Environment and Water is the NCA for contained use and deliberate release whilst the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has powers to grant, modify and withdraw authorizations for 
placing GMOs and their products on the market. 
The clear division of roles and responsibilities between different NCAs is not only cost-effective and 
expedient, but also prudent. Multiple NCA involvement reinforces inter-Ministerial collaboration and 
greater national ownership of decisions.
Box 16: Examples of institutional responsibilities for risk assessment:
Tajikistan – Risk assessment will be (the responsibility of) an Expert Board under NBBC. It will consist 
of experts from research institutions of Academy of Science, Tajik Academy of Agricultural Science and 
Ministry for Healthcare. All these subdivisions have a relevant capacity, technical equipment and work 
experience. 
Albania – the National Biosafety Committee makes decisions, being advised by Scientific Commission 
of the National Biosafety Committee. The scientific committee shall consist of seven members. The 
members of the scientific committee will be experts from the field of microbiology, genetics, medicine, 
biochemistry and molecular biology, pharmacy, agriculture, veterinary science, biotechnology and safety 
at work. 
Tonga – The Director for Department of Environment (the NCA) can specify the means by which 
scientifically based risk assessments are to be carried out, and appoint appropriate bodies to undertake 
risk assessments.
Caribbean – The NCA is assisted in its work by a Scientific Advisory Committee, which is responsible 
for conducting risk assessment. In Grenada and the Bahamas, risk assessment is done by the overall 
coordinating body mentioned before. In addition to the Scientific Advisory Committee, St. Lucia’s 
National Competent Authority is supported in its work by a legislated entity called the Biosafety Unit. 
Staffing of the Unit is also legally constituted and is comprised of the following: biosafety coordinator, 
information technology specialist, biosafety appraisal officer, public education specialist, administrative 
secretary and inspectors.
Gambia – An inter-sectoral National Biosafety Technical Working Group will be established with primary 
responsibility for risk assessment;  decision making will be through the National Biosafety Technical 
Committee.
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53. Some NBFs allow for non-government representation on the decision making body (e.g. 
Iran, Jordan, yemen, Bhutan). In the draft NBFs in the region, the proposals for decision 
making include a variety of different models: 
ÿ A multi-stakeholder body (usually made up of government agencies) for decision-
making, sometimes chaired by environment (e.g. Jordan, kyrgyzstan, Iran, Lebanon 
yemen);
ÿ Decision making function vested in a single, after consultation with other agencies 
or with a multi-stakeholder advisory body (e.g. Bhutan, Cambodia);
ÿ Decision making function vested in multiple NCAs, after consultation with 
other agencies and/or with a multi-stakeholder advisory body (e.g. Indonesia, 
Philippines, viet Nam).
Box 17:  Examples of different decision-making roles and responsibilities 
Bhutan – the NCA (BAFRA) is responsible for making the final decision but may consult the NCB for 
a technical opinion and recommendations.  They may also consult with the National Environment 
Commission  (NEC) where it considers that an application may have long term national implications.
Caribbean – The Minister responsible for biosafety is the final decision maker for Grenada, St. Lucia 
and Dominica whereas in the Bahamas, it is the Director, Department of Environment Protection and 
Planning or the Undersecretary, Bahamas Environment and Technology Commission following Cabinet 
approval in each case. 
Czech Republic – applications are submitted to Ministry of the Environment. Ministry of Environment 
sends it to Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture for their opinion, and also to advisory 
body Czech Commission for the Use of Genetically Modified Organisms and Products. Commission 
has 15 members, from ministries, academia, institutes, universities, NGOs and organic farming 
and  consumer associations. These two Ministries (through their panels of experts) and the Czech 
Commission prepare their independent expert opinions. MoE has to consider all comments, objections 
and standpoints obtained, including that submitted by the public, in its final decision.
PNG – The DEC based on recommendations from a Biosafety and Biotechnology Council (NBBC) 
consisting of 11 members created under the Bill, to be appointed by the National Executive Council, 
and to be chaired by the head of DEC.  If there is however an appeal, the Minister can either uphold or 
overturn the decision of the NCA, so the Minister is ultimately the decision maker.
Nigeria – Decision making executed through a National Biosafety Agency with its technical 
committees that ensure sound scince input into decision making.
Kenya – Under the proposed Bill, Kenya will establish a National Biosafety Authority with a Chief 
Executive Officer, to be the administrative body. This National Biosafety Authority will be managed by 
a Board, which has a multi-stakeholder membership of 15, comprising senior representatives from 
key Ministries and Agencies, academia, consumers and farmers. Board members will have a fixed 
tenure, receive remuneration and have clearly defined roles and responsibilities Decision-making 
rests with the Board, whose members will have a fixed tenure, receive remuneration and have clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities. This National Biosafety Authority will be able to appoint relevant 
advisory committees on scientific, technical and other matters, when the need arises. Institutions, 
which are carrying out genetic modification R&D, are required to establish IBCs to oversee biosafety 
at institutional level. The IBCs are indirectly answerable to National Biosafety Authority via their 
institutions.
Institutional set-ups in demonstration project countries
54. The experiences of the countries that are implementing their NBF in the demonstration 
projects show that most countries have adopted a 2-tier administrative structure, 
with separate and distinct administrative and decision-making bodies. Technical and 
scientific advisory committees often assist the decision-making body by providing 
advice after evaluating the safety aspects of the applications. Advisory committees can 
be established at two levels: institutional and national levels. Institutional Biosafety 
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Committees (IBCs) are sometimes required by law to be set up in institutions conducting 
genetic modification, to ensure safety in contained use. IBCs are usually responsible 
to the national biosafety advisory committee, either directly or indirectly via their 
institutions.  
55. An administrative body is established under the primary legislation in all countries to 
give them the power of authority to receive and process biosafety applications and to 
make decisions. Even in countries, such as kenya and China, where the Bill is pending 
approval, interim administrative measures to handle requests are operational and 
applications are being processed. In kenya, the interim measures operate within the 
National Council for Science and Technology under the Science and Technology Act.  
56. Under the proposed Bill, kenya will establish a National Biosafety Authority with 
a Chief Executive Officer, to be the administrative body. This National Biosafety 
Authority will be managed by a Board, which has a multi-stakeholder membership 
of 15, comprising senior representatives from key Ministries and Agencies, academia, 
consumers and farmers. Board members will have a fixed tenure, receive remuneration 
and have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Decision-making rests with 
the National Biosafety Authority, which will be able to appoint relevant advisory 
committees on scientific, technical and other matters, when the need arises. Institutions, 
which are carrying out genetic modification R&D, are required to establish IBCs to 
oversee biosafety at institutional level. The IBCs are indirectly answerable to National 
Biosafety Authority via their institutions. 
57. In Cameroon , the National Biosafety Committee was set up in accordance with section 
5(2) of the Law 2003/006, which states that the ‘Competent National Administration’ 
will be the national authority in charge of coordinating activities related to biosafety. 
The National Competent Administration shall be responsible for carrying out the 
administrative duties prescribed by the Cartagena Protocol on the prevention of 
biotechnology risks. It shall take its decision within a National Committee of 19 
members from services and bodies concerned. A sub committee within the National 
Biosafety Committee, called the the Scientific Advisor Committee shall be established 
and ad hoc membership into this committee is also allowed as the need arises.  
58. Namibia will establish a Biosafety Council under the draft Bill, with a Registrar to 
manage the administrative functions. The appointment of the 7-member Biosafety 
Council is a transparent process, where nominations from the public would be 
invited through announcements in the government Gazette and two popular national 
newspapers. The Council members will to be drawn from diverse backgrounds ranging 
from environment, animal and public health, molecular biology, law, research and 
development, trade and economics, etc. The exact composition is not mentioned. By 
specifying the expertise rather than the organizations/agencies whom the Council 
members will represent will have flexibility to involve wider public and private 
participation than having a fixed number of positions allocated to different stakeholders. 
The prior approval of the Minister is required for appointment of Council members. The 
Council members receive remunerations; have a fixed term of service with defined roles 
and responsibilities. Ad hoc Expert Committees in technical and scientific matters will be 
appointed to assist the Council. 
 
59. Poland, on the other hand, has the Minister responsible for the environment to be the 
Governmental administrative authority. The Minister is the ultimate authority to grant 
consents and permits. A Commission on GMOs established under the Law, acts as 
A  c o m p A r A t i v e  A n A l y s i s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e s  A n d  l e s s o n s  f r o m  t h e  U n e p - G e f  B i o s A f e t y  p r o j e c t s
32
an opinion making and advisory body to the Minister. The 19-member Commission 
has representatives from relevant Ministries, the President of the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Agency, the scientific community, the biotechnology business, 
non-governmental organizations and consumer organizations. Members of Commission 
have a defined tenure, receive financial support for expenses incurred when on duty 
outside the locality of their residence and have clear terms of reference.
NBF: Addressing Article 23 of the CPB
60. Countries have addressed Article 23of the Cartagena Protocol on public awareness, 
education and participation in different ways, depending on each country’s particular 
social, political and economic situation.  
61. The main way in which the public has been involved has been through each country’s 
NBF development project. The project required each country to not only carry out 
awareness and education activities on biosafety, but also required that the process 
of developing the NBF involved public participation in making key decisions (see 
Figure 2). The main mechanism for participation in the development of NBFs was 
through the National Coordinating committee (NCC), which was required in every 
country participating in the project. The NCC was responsible for overall policy 
guidance for the development of the NBF, and all countries formed such a body. In these 
countries, the NCC became the overall policy and decision-making body for GMOs 
as part of the institutional set-up in the NBF. The NCC included relevant government 
agencies, as well as representatives from other stakeholders in all countries.  
62. In the countries in Asia, the breakdown of statistics for the NCC is as follows:
ÿ All countries included government representatives on the NCC;
ÿ 13 countries included NGO representatives in their NCC. These included 
representatives from Consumer associations (e.g. in Jordan, yemen), farmers’ 
associations (e.g. Tajikistan), Women’s organisations (e.g. DPR korea), or 
environmental NGOs (kazakhstan, Nepal, Sri Lanka);
ÿ 10 countries included private sector representation in their NCC, usually from the 
Chamber of Commerce (e.g. Nepal, yemen) or similar commercial associations (e.g. 
kyrgyzstan, Philippines) or private firms (e.g. Iran, Indonesia);
ÿ 16 countries included public sector scientists in their NCC, including universities 
(e.g. Jordan, Myanmar, Syria) and public research institutes (e.g. Syria, Iran, 
Republic of korea);
ÿ One (yemen) included media representation;
ÿ 1 country included NGO representatives in their NCC. These included 
representatives mainly from Environment NGOs (e.g. Tajikistan).
63.	 In	the	Pacific	Island	countries,	the	breakdown	of	statistics	for	the	NCC	is	as	follows:
ÿ All countries included government representatives on the NCC;
ÿ 6 countries included NGO representatives in their NCC. These included 
representatives from Consumer Associations (e.g. Fiji), women’s organizations (e.g. 
kiribati) and environment NGOs (e.g. Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Samoa);
ÿ 8 countries included private sector representation in their NCC, usually from the 
Chamber of Commerce (e.g. Fiji, kiribati, vanuatu, Samoa), private firms (Solomon 
Islands, Samoa);
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ÿ 5 countries included public sector scientists in their NCC, in particular universities 
(e.g. Fiji, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands) or research institutes (e.g. 
Papua New Guinea); 
ÿ  1 country included media representation (e.g. Niue).
64. In the CEE countries, the breakdown of statistics for the NCC is as follows:
ÿ All countries included government representatives on the NCC;
ÿ 13 countries included NGO representatives in their NCC. These included 
representatives from Consumer Associations (e.g. Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Turkey, Albania) and environmental NGOs (e.g. Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, Croatia, Slovakia, Moldova);
ÿ 10 countries included private sector representation in their NCC, from the Chamber 
of Commerce (e.g. Slovenia), similar commercial and trade associations (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Turkey, Albania) or private firms (e.g. Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Belarus);
ÿ 16 countries included public sector scientists in their NCC, including universities 
and academies (e.g. Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovakia, Romania) and public research institutes 
(e.g. Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, Albania, 
Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Croatia, Romania, 
Slovakia);
ÿ 4 countries included media representation (e.g. Belarus, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovakia, Romania).
65. In the African countries, the breakdown of statistics for the NCC is as follows:
ÿ All countries included government representatives on the NCC;
ÿ 23 countries included NGO representatives in their NCC. These included 
representatives from Consumer Associations (e.g. Central African Republic, Chad, 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Togo, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina 
Faso, Sierra Leone, Mali, Mozambique), farmer’s associations (e.g. Nigeria), 
women’s organizations (e.g., Central African Republic, Mali), or environmental 
NGOs (e.g. Togo, Sudan, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo, Burundi, Botswana, Algeria, Lesotho, Benin, Guinea, 
Mali, Mozambique, Sudan);
ÿ 15 countries included private sector representation in their NCC, usually from 
the Chamber of Commerce (e.g. Chad, Djibouti, Togo, Guinea, Botswana, Guinea, 
Seychelles), similar commercial associations (e.g. Botswana, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Liberia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria) or private firms (e.g. Gambia, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Burkina Faso, Algeria);
ÿ 21 countries included public sector scientists in their NCC, including universities 
(e.g. Burundi, Central African Republic, Ghana, Madagascar, Liberia, Togo, 
Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Madagascar, Lesotho, 
Ghana, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Swaziland, Botswana) and public research institutes (e.g. Zimbabwe, 
Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, 
Burundi, Ghana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Algeria, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Swaziland, Gambia, Botswana);
ÿ 4 countries included media representation (e.g. Senegal, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, 
Gabon). 
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66. In the Latin American and Caribbean countries, the breakdown of statistics for the 
NCC is as follows:
ÿ All countries included government representatives on the NCC;
ÿ 15 countries included NGO representatives in their NCC. These included 
representatives from Consumer Associations (e.g. Ecuador, Costa Rica, Argentina, 
Saint Lucia), farmer’s associations (e.g. Argentina), women’s organizations (e.g. 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago), or environmental NGOs (e.g. Ecuador, Peru, 
venezuela, Costa Rica, Bahamas, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Argentina, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, Uruguay);
ÿ 10 countries included private sector representatives in their NCC, usually from 
forums (e.g. Argentina), Chamber of Commerce (e.g. Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Suriname), commercial associations (e.g. Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Argentina, Saint 
Lucia, Uruguay) or private firms (e.g. Costa Rica, Grenada);
ÿ 15 countries included public sector scientists in their NCC, including universities 
(e.g. Barbados, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Dominican Republic, Chile, Peru, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Antigua and Barbuda) 
and public research institutes (e.g. Barbados, Guatemala, Saint Lucia, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Peru, venezuela, Bahamas). 
67. The main focus of countries in terms of Article 23 during the NBF development, given 
both the state of awareness of biosafety and biotechnology issues in these countries, was 
on:
ÿ Increasing public awareness about GMOs through workshops, use of media such 
as television and radio, regular newspaper articles, and publications on biosafety. 
This was one of the main activities required for each national project, accounting 
for some 20% of the total costs of the project. Given the diversity of language in 
Asia, with over 20 different languages in the 23 countries, the emphasis was on 
publications and awareness in the main national languages. All countries in the 
Pacific translate public awareness materials into their local languages;
ÿ Strengthening public education on GMOs, in order to complement this, all 23 
countries also carried out extensive activities, mostly using informal means, but in 
some cases also through more formal channels (e.g. Sri Lanka);
ÿ Enabling public access to information on GMOs for their effective participation in 
decision-making. This was done both through production of information on GMOs 
in printed form and by setting up websites on biosafety. For example, 16 of the 23 
countries set up websites (usually as part of the NEA’s website) on biosafety or 
specifically on the NBF project. These were in the main national language of the 
country. One, yemen, even used its website to conduct a survey on whether yemen 
should ratify the CPB.
68. In those countries that have completed their NBFs, the main provisions for promoting 
participation by stakeholders in Biosafety Decision-making are consistent with Article 
23. In many countries, these provisions are enshrined in the Biosafety regulatory 
instrument (see Box 16 for examples), and include the following examples:
ÿ Public consultation on GMO activities is included in all NBFs. These activities not 
only include applications for permits for environmental release or importation, but 
also involved public participation in biotechnology research. For example, some 
countries that set up institutional biosafety committees to oversee biotechnology 
research in their public sector research institutions also included provision for 
representation from civil society on the institutional biosafety committee, for 
example Iran and Philippines.
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ÿ The public are usually invited to make submissions on applications at an early 
stage of the decision-making process; in many countries, this is enshrined in the 
biosafety regulatory instrument - for example Myanmar, Lebanon, Philippines, 
Tajikistan, Samoa, Niue, etc. 
ÿ Information on applications made available to the public (Box 18, 19) as required 
by the regulatory instrument not only through the national BCH, but also in a form 
that is easily accessible – for example, Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, yemen. Access 
to information is usually restricted to non-confidential information as defined in the 
regulatory instrument, and in conformity with Article 21 of the CPB.
ÿ The public are often given opportunities to provide comments within a specified 
time (usually 30 days), with the mechanisms for this enshrined in the regulatory 
instrument, and set out in each NBF in the procedures described for processing of 
applications – for example, in Asia: Bhutan, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Maldives; 
in CEE all EU and also most of other CEE countries.
ÿ The decision-making body is mostly required to take into account public comments 
in making their decisions on GMOs; this is again usually enshrined in the biosafety 
regulatory instrument, for example Philippines (Box 13), Jordan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, 
Iran. 
ÿ Many countries have provided for non-government representation on the biosafety 
decision-making body. Examples from Asia include: 
t Iran – on institutional and national biosafety committees, private sector and/
or public;
t Jordan – private sector and consumer reps on National Biosafety Committee;
t Philippines – civil society representation on the National Committee on 
Biosafety of the Philippines and on institutional biosafety committees;
t Lebanon – private sector, NGO reps on National Biosafety Council; 
t yemen – Chamber of Commerce and Consumer Society on National Biosafety 
Committee. 
69. Of the NBFs completed in the Pacific, only PNG has made specific allowance for 
public input into decision-making, and public participation in the licensing process is a 
mandatory requirement of the Biotechnology and Biosafety Bill:
ÿ ”33 (3). The Council shall invite written and oral submissions from individuals, 
governmental authorities, provincial and local-level governments, holders of traditional 
knowledge, industry, interest groups and members of the public and stating a period of 
time (which shall not be less than 30 days and not more than three months) within which 
submissions may be made to the Council”, and
ÿ ”42 (6). The Council may, after considering submissions from the public and a technical 
expert panel, renew or cancel the licence.” 
70. For Samoa, vanuatu and Tonga, the NBFs place emphasis on public awareness and roles 
of National Focal Points in facilitating public input but legislations do not specifically 
provide provisions for how public input are taken into account or considered in the 
decision-making.
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Public Participation in GMO decision-making in demonstration project countries
71. Article 23 of the CPB is one of the biggest challenges in biosafety implementation in all 8 
countries, because effective public participation means allowing the public to participate 
in all steps in the approval process, from the time when an application is received to 
making a decision on the application. Because this process is novel, full implementation 
of public participation, especially in decision-making, is yet to be realized in some 
countries.  
72. Most countries have met the requirement of public participation in decision-making 
by including members of the public like non-governmental organizations, farmers or 
traders in either the scientific and technical advisory committees and/or the decision-
making body. Depending on the rules and procedures of decision-making in these 
committees, the voice of the public representatives may not always be heard, although 
this is a start in the right direction. 
73. Public access to information and participation in decision-making are enshrined in the 
GMO Act 2005 of Bulgaria. Information to the public is through three main channels, 
namely the mass media, the electronic Public Register and public consultation/hearing. 
The e-Public Register is accessible to the public, and is updated regularly. This Register 
provides information on all decisions made by the Commission on releases and placing 
of GMOs in the market. In addition, the Register also records areas where deliberate 
releases of GMOs have been authorized as well as registered premises where contained 
use of GMOs is carried out. The public is further informed/consulted through public 
hearings before any GMOs are to be released into the environment, and before these 
are placed in the market for sale. Public comments received are considered in decision 
making by the Commission. Since the Commission has 3 representatives from civil 
society, public participation in decision-making is further ensured.  
74. Namibia has a similar process for public participation and access to information. In 
the case of Namibia, the applicant is obliged to advertise at its own expense, in the 
local newspapers for a period specified in the draft law, about its application. The 
Biosafety Council, which makes decisions on applications, is required to conduct public 
consultations/hearings and notify the public of the application received in at least two 
local newspapers. Public participation in decision-making is further guaranteed through 
the membership of the Council, who are public-nominated. Some countries (Bulgaria, 
kenya, Namibia) use the Register to provide information on Council decisions and 
actions to the public. National websites or Biosafety Clearing Houses is another 
common avenue for public information. 
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Box 18: Examples of how information requirements for public participation are handled in the CEE:
Belarus – the National Co-ordination Biosafety Centre within 10 days from the arrival of the application shall place 
the information (excluding confidential one) at the information web-site of the National Co-ordination Biosafety 
Centre. Comments and proposals are accepted by the Centre within 60 days from the release of the application 
materials. The experts, performing the expertise of the application, are obliged to review and, where appropriate, 
take into account the comments and proposals submitted. In case it is impossible to take into account particular 
comments and proposals, the experts are obliged to provide written reasonable objections to the Centre. The 
comments and proposals and results of their review by the Expert Committee should be reflected in the expert 
opinion.
Czech Republic - notifications are published regularly on the MoE website and at the official desk of the Ministry 
of the Environment. Public can send comments. Received comments are discussed at public hearing, the results 
are taken into account in the final decision issued by the CA. Final decisions and the lists of authorised GMOs are 
published on the website of the Ministry of Environment. Similar system is used in all EU countries and many 
other countires (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  Macedonia Malta, also in Moldova,  Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
Romania - within 10 days from the date when the CA accepts the notification (the notification contains all needed 
information), CA informs the public about the application, specifying the means by which information can be 
obtained and the deadline for receiving comments. CA publishes in its website “The Notification Summary” as well 
as the “Risk Assessment Study” and other relevant documents (i.e. monitoring reports) and transmits a press 
release, through the Directorate for Public Relations within the ministry. At the same time, announcements are 
transmitted to the Territorial Environment Protection Agencies under Ministry. Comments of the public can be 
submitted within 30 days from the date of public announcement and will be taken into consideration by the CA in 
the decision-making process for the authorization of the proposed activity. Depending on the received comments, 
public debates can be organized.
Georgia – NCA provides the announcement about receiving an application. This public announcement shall be 
made available through the specially designated web-site and publication in the Official Gazette of Georgia and at 
least in 2 nationwide newspapers.  Public announcement shall contain name and address of contact person of the 
CA who will be responsible for providing of required information to general public. Representatives of the public 
may send their opinions, observations and standpoints within 90 days of the public announcement. Additionally, 
the NCA  could organize consultations with public representatives. Opinions, observations and standpoints of the 
public representatives shall be taken into account during decision-making process.
Box 19: Examples of requirements for public participation (Box 2)
The case of the CEE countries:
Most of CEE countries have ratified Aarhus Convention and according to this convention, public must have access to 
information, decision making and also access to justice. All EU countires have trnasposed Directive 2003/4/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental information. This Directive ensures access 
to environmental information. The objectives of Directive are:
a) to guarantee the right of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities and to set out the 
basic terms and conditions of, and practical arrangements for, its exercise; and
b) to ensure that environmental information is progressively made available and disseminated to the public in 
order to achieve the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination of environmental information to the 
public. Therefore, in particular, computer telecommunication and/or electronic technology, where available, shall be 
promoted.
In the EU countries, public has right to give their opinion before decision is made during 30 days after the 
announcement has been published by NCA. 
The case of the Caribbean countries:
The draft final NBFs of Grenada, St. Lucia, Dominica, the Bahamas and Antigua and Barbuda make allowances for 
public input into the decision making process and for public education. For input into the decision making process, 
interaction with the public is by way of notifications placed mainly in mass print media by the respective National 
Competent Authority for each country. In addition to the placement of public notices in the mass print media, each 
National Competent Authority may establish a more deliberate consultative process with other government agencies, 
representatives from academia, the business community or other stakeholders to cater for public input into the 
decision making process. In St. Lucia, the legally constituted Biosafety Unit has responsibility for investigating 
complaints. Complaints from the public can be taken up after the decision making process in St. Lucia but if 
criminality is involved, they are sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions for investigation. St. Lucia’s draft final NBF 
also caters for a legally constituted Appeals Tribunal. 
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Box 20: Example of requirements for public participation:
Philippines: legal instrument EO 514, states:
7.1	 Scope	of	Public	Participation. Public participation shall apply to all stages of the biosafety decision-
making process from the time the application is received. For applications on biotechnology activities 
related to research and development, limited primarily for contained use, notice of such application 
through the NCBP shall be sufficient unless public interest and welfare requires otherwise. 
7.2	 Minimum	Requirements	of	Public	Participation. In conducting public participation processes, the 
following minimum requirements shall be followed:
7.2.1 Notice to all concerned stakeholders, in a language understood by them and through media 
to which they have access.  Such notice must be adequate, timely, and effective and posted 
prominently in public places in the areas affected, and in the case of field trials and commercial 
releases, in both national and local print and broadcast media. In all cases, such notices must 
be posted electronically in the internet;
7.2.2 Adequate and reasonable time frames for public participation procedures. Such procedures 
should allow relevant stakeholders to understand and analyze the benefits and risks, consult 
with independent experts, and make timely interventions. Concerned departments and agencies 
shall include in their appropriate rules and regulations specific time frames for their respective 
public participation processes, including setting a minimum time frame as may be appropriate;
7.2.3 Public consultations, as a way to secure wide input into the decisions that are to be made. 
These could include formal hearings in certain cases, or solicitation of public comments, 
particularly where there is public controversy about the proposed activities. Public consultations 
shall encourage exchanges of information between applicants and the public before the 
application is acted upon. Dialogue and consensus-building among all stakeholders shall be 
encouraged. Concerned departments and agencies shall specify in their appropriate rules and 
regulations the stages when public consultations are appropriate, the specific time frames for 
such consultations, and the circumstances when formal hearings will be required, including 
guidelines to ensure orderly proceedings. The networks of agricultural and fisheries councils, 
indigenous peoples and community-based organizations in affected areas shall be utilized;
7.2.4 Written submissions. Procedures for public participation shall include mechanisms that allow 
public participation in writing or through public hearings, and which allow the submission 
of any positions, comments, information, analyses or opinions.  Concerned departments 
and agencies shall include in their appropriate rules and regulations the stages when and the 
process to be followed for submitting written comments; and,
7.2.5 Consideration of public concerns in the decision-making phase following consultation and 
submission of written comments. Public concerns as reflected through the procedures for 
public participation shall be considered in making the decision. The public must be informed of 
the final decision promptly, have access to the decision, and shall be provided with the reasons 
and considerations resulting in the decision, upon request.
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NBF: Addressing socio-economic issues
75. The socio-economic impacts of biotechnology are an important consideration for all of 
the countries in the NBF project; many countries have included the consideration of 
Socio-economic issues in their decision-making process. These provisions are consistent 
with Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol, and usually form part of the national policy 
on biosafety in the NBF, for example Lebanon, or are part of the regulatory instrument, 
for example Republic of korea, yemen, Philippines and Bhutan (Box 21). Other countries 
have chosen not to include socio-economic considerations in their NBF; these include 
Iran and Jordan in Asia; Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Moldova, most of EU countries in 
the CEE: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The 
latter is because in the EU, socio-economic issues are evaluated by a special committee 
on the level of the EU and member states are not supposed to evaluate those issues 
separately. 
Box 21: Example of how Article 26 is addressed in an NBF:
Philippines – the EO 514 states in article 5.4  Socio-economic, Ethical, Cultural and Other 
Considerations. Consistent with Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol, concerned government 
departments and agencies may take into account socio-economic considerations arising from the 
impact of regulated articles on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially 
with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities.
Yemen – The draft legal instrument in Yemen states that the decision-making process shall consider 
an evaluation of Socioeconomic risks in parallel with scientific risk assessment, and that Biosafety 
decisions shall take into account issues of:
ÿ Poverty alleviation, food security, etc;
ÿ Livelihoods of small farmers, indigenous people, women, small and medium enterprises, etc;
ÿ Cultural integrity of the country and communities.
Caribbean – Consideration of socio-economic impact of trade in LMOs and derived products is 
catered for by all draft final NBFs as part of the decision making process. Assessment of socio-
economic impact is required as part of the risk assessment report prepared by each National 
Competent Authority. In Dominica, this assessment is specifically delegated to a competent regional 
authority to make up for the absence of the necessary skills in the country.
Georgia – CA makes decision, based on recommendation of the Advisory Council, standpoints of 
the Scientific Commission and other ministeies, and they have right to make decision on granting of 
permit on GMOs use taking into account, inter alia, socio-economic considerations and circumstances.
Romania – The CA takes into consideration the socio-economic aspects, but permits or approval can 
only be denied on grounds related to the protection of the environment and/or human health.
Swaziland – Socio economic aspects of the people of Swaziland and their ethical considerations shall 
be taken into consideration when biosafety decisions are made.
Tanzania – In implementing the NBF, the social, economic and ethical considerations shall be taken 
into account in Biosafety decisions. The NCAs have the mandate to undertake assessment of socio-
economic impacts
Samoa – The policy pays attention to socio-economic related issues including; improved quality of life, 
sustained economic growth, and cultural values.  In the decision-making, the NCA will take account of 
the particular impacts of GMOs on communities; ensure that “Cabinet, and all Ministries and agencies, 
are fully informed of ….. any other matter associated with GMOs which may affect the well-being of 
the nation or the health of its people”; and will take into consideration customs and traditions.  
Argentina – A key part of the GMO regulatory process consists of verifying that the commercial 
approval will not have a negative impact on our foreign trade. This specific assessment is carried 
out by the  National Bureau of Agrifood Markets  and it includes an analysis of the current status of 
regulatory systems and public acceptance in the importing countries.
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Implementing the NBF: Translating the map into action
76. As described above the process of developing the NBF is a knowledge mapping process 
that helps the country to identify not only its needs and priorities for the safe use of 
biotechnology, but also its human, technical and institutional resources needed to 
translate the NBF into action. Thus the establishment and strengthening of the systems 
that make up the NBF (Figure 1) are but a first step in this process of translation; the 
second step is the implementation of the NBF so that these systems are up and running.
77. In all the countries participating in the NBF development project, the long-term aim is to 
translate the NBF into practical and workable systems, and as countries complete their 
NBF, they have started to do this. The process of translation is backed up by government 
commitment, which has been demonstrated in a number of ways: by approval of the 
NBF, approval of the biosafety policy in the NBF, and by promulgation of the biosafety 
regulatory instrument by the appropriate body.
78. Most countries that are Parties to the CPB have turned to the GEF for further assistance 
in order to implement their NBF. In Asia, the current status is as follows:
ÿ Two countries, viet Nam and Cambodia, that completed their NBFs in 2005 and 
2004 respectively, have had their implementation projects approved by the GEF 
and have already started the process of implementing their NBF; initial activities 
are focussed on capacity building in order to draft and implement specific biosafety 
secondary legislation for their primary regulatory instrument. In viet Nam, the 
biosafety regulation has been promulgated as a Prime Minister decision (212) whilst 
in Cambodia, the draft biosafety law has been approved by the Cabinet and is 
currently under consideration by Parliament;
ÿ Two other countries, DPR korea and Tajikistan, have had their projects for 
implementation of their NBF technically cleared by GEF and are awaiting the final 
approval so that they can start the implementation of their NBF. In both countries, 
the Biosafety Laws have been approved by their parliament: the People’s Assembly 
in DPR korea and the Majlis in Tajikistan; 
ÿ Six other countries are in an advanced stage of preparation of their project 
proposals for implementation. All of these have indicated government support 
for the implementation of the NBF through their endorsement of the proposals 
as a priority for funding under the new GEF resource allocation framework for 
each country. The countries with advanced proposals for implementation of their 
include:
t Indonesia has a proposal, endorsed by the government, ready for submission 
to GEF;
t Iran, Sri Lanka, Laos, Bhutan, and yemen have started the process of 
translating their NBFs into practical action plans for implementation by 
preparing project proposals for funding by GEF through an iterative and 
participatory process of analysis and planning.
ÿ One country, Republic of korea, which is not eligible for GEF funding, has started 
implementation of their NBF entirely with government funding.
79. In the Pacific, Samoa, Tonga, Niue and PNG have started development of 
implementation project proposals for GEF funding. All Parties in the Pacific have 
indicated willingness to commit some of their biodiversity Resource Allocation 
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Framework allocations to implementation of NBFs. Given the unique challenges faced 
by Pacific Small Island Developing States including, limited absorptive capacity, small 
sizes, no economies of scale, etc., Pacific SIDS will look towards regional mechanisms 
and pooling of resources in a regional project during implementation to ensure 
sustainability.
80. In the CEE region, six countries have prepared and submitted their MSPs to GEF, 5 of 
them have been approved – Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Slovakia. 
Latvia has been cleared for CEO approval, but the project has not yet been finally 
approved. In all those countries, former development project staff have been used for 
preparation of new project and most of them will be involved in implementing the 
project. 
81. A number of CEE countries have started work on proposals for implementation of 
their NBF:
ÿ Belarus has prepared a project proposal, and on revision will presented after 
approval of the GEF strategy;
ÿ Armenia has started to prepare and plan to submit a proposal under RAF; 
ÿ Albania has declared biosafety as a priority for them and intend to apply for 
funding under RAF. 
82. Two countries not eligible for GEF funding are implementing their NBF with 
government funds; these include Slovenia and Malta. Hungary is also implementing its 
NBF, developed under the pilot project, without GEF assistance. 
83. The rest of CEE countries would be interested in implementation, but under RAF they 
have other priorities and they may have to find other resources for biosafety.  
84. None of the Caribbean countries have begun implementation of their NBFs. The 
countries have, however made proposals to the GEF for funds for a regional project 
to implement their NBFs. Those that have completed their NBFs are in the process of 
preparing project documents for their implementation. 
85. The experience of countries implementing their NBF projects highlights the importance 
of sustainability. These countries have addressed financial sustainability in their 
respective legislation by committing Government budget to maintain the administrative 
and decision making bodies that were set up by the UNEP/GEF Implementation 
projects. Additional income will be generated through the levy of fees to be charged for 
requests, applications and other regulatory or monitoring activities carried out by the 
NCA, to augment the national budget.  
86. Under the draft Bill of Namibia, the Commission will defray all expenditure incurred in 
the administration of the Bill to the National Research, Science and Technology Fund, 
which was established under the Research, Science and Technology Act, 2004. Even 
before the conclusion of the project, Government financial support has already been 
used to maintain a technician to operation a GMO detection laboratory.  
87. In Poland, the State Budget covers the expenses incurred by its Commission on GMOs. 
In addition, Poland has an innovative mechanism to avert large financial loss by the 
Government by having a mandatory ‘claim security’ in the form of a bank guarantee 
or insurance policy to be deposited with the Commission. This is needed to protect 
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the Commission from liability, in the event that adverse environmental impact occurs 
during contained use of a GMO as a result of non-compliance to the conditions 
stipulated in the consent granted by the Commission.  
88. The commitment of the Chinese Government to sustain biosafety after project closure, is 
clearly demonstrated by its growing budget to support agricultural research in biosafety 
over the last few years. From an initial budget of slightly over US$ 80,000 in 1999, China 
now spends about US$ 3 million annually on agricultural biosafety related activities.3  
 
89. Building upon the impetus, momentum and foundation established by the 
implementation project after the project has completed, is very crucial for long-term 
implementation of national NBFs. In order to sustain biosafety implementation, 
financial resources are a prerequisite. Although the incomes accrued from fees and 
other regulatory levies may be modest at the beginning, these will increase with time, 
especially if the countries adopt biotechnology. Government commitment may also 
increase when the value of biosafety implementation is demonstrated.  
90. Another key issue is that within a region, countries need to work together, particularly 
in getting their national decision making systems on GMOs up and running. In other 
words, regional cooperation is essential for sustainability of the NBF at the national and 
regional levels. The critical elements for regional cooperation include:
ÿ Sharing of resources between countries within the region; this includes technical 
facilities, materials, and expertise;
ÿ Sharing of experiences between countries in developing and implementing NBFs; 
this includes methodologies, materials and know-how;
ÿ Sharing of information on biosafety between countries and through regional 
networks, including the BCH;
ÿ Building and strengthening regional capacity (Regional Centres of Excellence) for 
biosafety and biotechnology in order to support national decision-making. 
91. The importance of regional cooperation is recognised by many countries in all regions. 
However, one of the key lessons emerging from the projects is that regional cooperation 
has to be country driven and not in response to an external agenda. Therefore, for 
most countries, initial attempts at regional cooperation have taken the form of regional 
meetings to discuss potential areas for collaboration. Examples of such meetings during 
the development project include:
Asia
ÿ Central Asia – two meetings have been held to discuss sub-regional cooperation in 
biosafety and biotechnology. These were in Tajikistan in 2004 and in kyrgyzstan in 
2005;
ÿ South Asia – a similar meeting was held in Sri Lanka in April 2005 to discuss future 
areas for cooperation. This will be followed up by another meeting to be held 
in Bhutan early in 2007, as chair of the SAARC Environment Working Group to 
discuss regional cooperation in biosafety and biotechnology;
ÿ South-East Asia – a meeting of ASEAN countries was held in Manila in June 2004 to 
discuss potential areas for cooperation in biosafety, focussing on capacity building 
needs within the region for implementing NBFs;
3 The term “genetically modified organism” or “GMO” has been used in most sections of the paper. 
Where there is a specific discussion of the Protocol, the term “living modified organism” or “LMO” 
that appears in the Protocol has been used.
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ÿ West Asia – a meeting of West Asian and North African countries is planned for 
November 2006 in Syria to discuss the formulation of a regional project on capacity 
building for biotechnology and biosafety within this sub-region;
ÿ As countries start to implement their NBFs, they are starting to build on these initial 
discussions to work on real areas for cooperation. For example, Cambodia and viet 
Nam, as their first activity under their implementation project have planned a joint 
subregional training on drafting of biosafety secondary legislation. This training, 
to be held in October 2006, will bring these two countries together with Thailand 
(currently finalising its NBF), to discuss secondary legislation for biosafety. One 
of the aims of this training is to “To work with their neighbouring countries in 
developing their national regulations with a view to possible harmonisation in the 
future.” 
Pacific
ÿ Three regional meetings since 2003 to discuss regional cooperation and share 
experiences;
ÿ Because of the unique challenges faced by Pacific SIDS, including limited capacity 
and small sizes, a regional project to pool resources and achieve economies of scale 
is being considered for implementation of NBFs;
ÿ A Pacific regional node of the BCH is currently being developed to share 
information and promote regional cooperation.
CEE
92. There is no official regional organization covering the entire CEE, and organized 
regional cooperation (apart from EU) has been weak. However, the situation has 
improved a lot during the project. Many countries have used experts or project staff 
from their neighbouring countries, for example the NPC of Slovenia has been used for 
reviewing NBFs in Moldova, Macedonia, Serbia and Tajikistan. 
93. Most cooperation has been on a bilateral basis (Romania – Moldova, Ukraine –Belarus, 
Czech Republic – Slovakia, Belarus – Russia, etc). 
94.  The Balkan countries have started to work as a sub-regional grouping again. Croatia 
has organized many workshops with participants from all over the sub-region, for 
example the 16-19 December 2004 workshop on Sub-regional collaboration on biosafety 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia 
and Montenegro, and Slovenia. Contacts between Balkan countries are close and they 
cooperate on a daily basis, sharing experience and trying to work out common future 
plans. Slovenia as the most developed country in this region is acting as coordinator and 
assistant to the overall sub-region. Slovenia has also organized at least one sub-regional 
workshop, 11-12 September 2003, on “Public awareness and Participation”; participants 
from Slovenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia and Moldova were present. 
95. The Czech Republic has been very active in organizing sub-regional workshops, for 
example the 24-25 April 2003 Sub-Regional meeting on Biosafety Frameworks in Prague, 
which involved participants from Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia; and the 
10-11 November 2004 workshop on Implementation of NBF which involved the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
96. The Caucasus countries have shown an interest in setting up a regional reference centre, 
but there are political constraints in deciding in which country this centre should be 
established. 
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97. During 2006, the main regional activities have been among the Balkan countries. 
Romania and Serbia and Montenegro have developed very close connections and 
good every-day cooperation. Project coordinators communicate and visit each others’ 
workshops regularly. For example, the NPC of Romania participated in June 2005 in 
Novi Sad School of Journalism, “Focus: genetically modified organisms”. Additionally 
were there also participants from Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Slovenia and Serbia & Montenegro. 
98. In June 2005 NPC from Serbia and MN participated in workshop in Romania “Biosafety 
Public Awareness and Participation, in October 2006 Serbia and MN NPC and Bulgaria 
NPC (for implementation project) participated in Romania NBF drafting workshop. 
There were also other members of the Implementation Project from Bulgaria in this 
meeting. 
99. Apart from Balkan, there has been limited regional cooperation in Caucasus countries. 
In December 2005 Azerbaijan organized a workshop on RARM where they invited 
expert from Belarus. They plan to use experts from Georgia and Moldova in their next 
workshops.
Caribbean
100. Caribbean countries are bound by a CARICOM treaty to barrier-free trade among 
themselves. This arrangement demands high levels of regional cooperation on biosafety. 
Accordingly the countries have begun, under the auspices of CARICOM, to formulate 
plans for regional coordination on biosafety and these include a regional project for 
implementation of NBFs.
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 Some lessons from development of NBFs
101. The comparative analysis of the experiences of countries developing their NBFs under 
the UNEP-GEF project highlight some of the key challenges faced by all countries in 
meeting their obligations as Parties to the CPB. These experiences provide lessons that 
will be relevant to future capacity building activities in biosafety as these countries start 
to implement their NBFs.
Biosafety as a sustainable development issue
102. Probably the most important lesson emerging from the experiences is that Biosafety is 
a sustainable development issue, and that it cannot be considered in isolation from a 
country’s development priorities. Critical elements of this set of lessons are that:
ÿ Biosafety policies need to address both environmental and development concerns, 
and not just the conservation of biodiversity even though the Cartagena Protocol is 
part of the CBD;
ÿ Biosafety laws and administrative systems have to complement and strengthen 
existing national systems, such as quarantine or EIA laws, rather than trying to set 
up a new parallel system;
ÿ The NBF has to work within the context of national development strategies and 
plans, and should not be seen as a stand-alone issue.
Responsiveness to national needs and priorities
103. Recognition of biosafety as a sustainable development issue means that the 
development of the NBF, and particularly the resultant product i.e. the national 
biosafety framework, must be responsive to national needs and priorities. This will 
promote sustainability of NBF by helping to: 
ÿ Ensure national ownership by grounding biosafety is in a country’s national needs 
and priorities;
ÿ Ensure that the country’s obligations under the Cartagena Protocol are used as 
an external stimulus to kick-start the NBF process, and stimulate public debate 
on GMOs, rather than being an end in itself. The mapping process advocated by 
the project in developing the NBF will help the country to decide its priorities for 
biotechnology and biosafety within the context of the overall national plans for 
sustainable development;
ÿ Promote political and public support for the NBF; this will depend on how relevant 
the NBF is to perceived national priorities. This is best achieved through an 
inclusive and participatory process for preparation of the NBF, as well as making 
full use of available national expertise and building on existing systems;
ÿ Tailor the NBF to the country’s needs and priorities, rather than imposing a set 
formula on a country. Within the overall framework provided by the NBF project, 
the development process for the NBF has been flexible so that countries are able to 
adapt it to their own situation. Moreover, the final form and content of the map of 
the NBF prepared by countries has been dictated by their national situation, needs 
and priorities. 
 VII.
A  c o m p A r A t i v e  A n A l y s i s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e s  A n d  l e s s o n s  f r o m  t h e  U n e p - G e f  B i o s A f e t y  p r o j e c t s
46
A country-driven process
104. A key lesson from the NBF development project is the importance of a country-driven 
process in preparing the NBF. The strong emphasis on this principle through the project 
has meant that the NBFs developed have a strong sense of national ownership; this is 
well illustrated by the support from government in many of the countries to not only 
seek outside assistance for capacity building for implementation of their NBF, but also 
to commit substantial government resources to both setting up the necessary systems 
and to maintain them on an on-going basis through financial allocations in the national 
budget for recurrent costs. 
 
105. Some of the critical elements helping to ensure a country driven process include:
ÿ A national “champion” to support the process of developing the NBF as well as to 
ensure that the results of the project, i.e. the components of the NBF have support 
from a wide range of stakeholders, including government agencies, the private 
sector and civil society;
ÿ The NBF projects in each country have utilized and strengthened national expertise 
to help develop the NBF, and then to operationalize the systems, procedures and 
processes. The role of outside experts has been to support and peer review national 
contributions rather than to take over the development and running of the NBF;
ÿ Provide access to technical resources from outside to support national resources – 
this could be in the form of technical resources such as manuals and toolkits, access 
to training opportunities, study visits, and in-country visits by outside experts. The 
series of regional and sub-regional training workshops by the global NBF project 
has been a key factor in helping to strengthen national capacity;
ÿ Each national project has been aimed at building on existing systems in government 
rather than inventing new ones in order to develop the NBF. The process of 
mapping the existing institutions, laws and resources has helped the country to 
identify how best to build on these systems in order to formulate a workable NBF.
An Inclusive approach 
106. Another important lesson is that an inclusive approach is needed in order to ensure the 
involvement of all stakeholders; this is crucial if the NBF is to be accepted by all parties 
within the country. This will not only help ensure support for the implementation of the 
NBF, but will also help promote the sustainability of the achievements.
107. The critical elements for an inclusive approach include:
ÿ The active involvement of all relevant government agencies in the development of 
the NBF, as well as in its implementation: in risk assessment, in decision making on 
GMOs, and in monitoring. These include not just environment agencies, but also 
science and technology, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health, education, etc;
ÿ As the Cartagena Protocol comes under the CBD, the entry point for the NBF 
project in all countries has been the focal point for the CPB, usually the Ministry 
of Environment. However, the NBF projects have used the multi-sectoral national 
coordinating committee (NCC) in each country to ensure the involvement of 
other stakeholders. The NCC has also helped to ensure that the main messages 
of biosafety are introduced to all stakeholders so that they become aware of the 
potential benefits of the safe use of biotechnology;
47
A  c o m p A r A t i v e  A n A l y s i s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e s  A n d  l e s s o n s  f r o m  t h e  U n e p - G e f  B i o s A f e t y  p r o j e c t s
ÿ Recognition that non-government stakeholders (private sector as well as civil 
society) have a key role in developing the NBF and in implementing the proposed 
systems and procedures. The initial emphasis on awareness and education during 
the NBF project has helped to lay a foundation for the future involvement of 
stakeholders in decision-making, as awareness and education are pre-requisites for 
effective participation;
ÿ The NBF developed through the project includes mechanisms for meaningful 
participation by stakeholders in decision making. This is usually enshrined in the 
regulatory instrument, with explicit mechanisms for public participation provided 
in the systems for handling applications; 
ÿ The NBFs also seek to provide stakeholders with access to biosafety information 
in a form that is readily understandable by all stakeholders and using media that 
any stakeholders can access. The means for access to information in the NBFs of 
various countries include not only internet based approaches such as the BCH, but 
also more traditional media such as printed materials, radio, television and public 
meetings.
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 Conclusion
108. The experiences of the NBF Development project demonstrates that building capacity 
for biosafety and the safe use of biotechnology within a country requires an approach 
based on harnessing national human and institutional resources rather than relying 
on outside expertise to develop the NBF and to put its provisions into practice. This 
means that in each participating country, it is crucial to strengthen national capacity in 
order to ensure sustainability of the NBF by laying a strong foundation for effective and 
sustained implementation of the systems in the NBF. 
109. The experiences of the NBF Development project also highlight the commitment of 
the countries participating in the project to biosafety and the CPB: 92 out of the 124 
countries in the project are already Parties to the Protocol and another most of the other 
countries are completing their national procedures for ratification. The NBFs not only 
provide the necessary legal instruments and other systems for implementation of the 
CPB, but the process of preparation of the NBF has started to build national capacity 
for effective implementation of the Protocol; this will need to be sustained through both 
externally funded and nationally supported capacity building efforts. 
VII.
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